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ABSTRACT
Since its origins in the years immediately following the
Second World War, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) has evolved
through the combined effects of external pressure from strategic
planning for a global war with the Soviet Union and the internal
bureaucratic and doctrinal infighting among the Joint Staff and
the various services. This infighting was not merely over
service 'turf battles', but also touched the very heart of the
individual services' philosophies on command in war.
This thesis follows the history of that evolutionary process
since World War II with an eye toward a future revision to the
UCP. Given the fundamentally altered geo-strategic situation
brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the author
argues for a complete revision of the UCP based on distinct post-
Cold War theater and regional missions. Instead of consolidating
the bulk of U.S.-based conventional forces into the U.S. Atlantic
Command, the author proposes the retention of several separate
(but joint) 'strategic' conventional forces commands based on
mission, readiness, and deployability/sustainability criteria.
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ZXECUTIVE SUIDgARY
Since its origins in the years immediately following the
Second World War, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) has evolved
through the combined effects of external pressure from strategic
planning for a global war with the Soviet Union centered on
Europe and the internal bureaucratic and doctrinal infighting
among the Joint Staff and the various services. The size, scope,
and service orientation of the Unified Commands that resulted
from this infighting reflected not merely the winners and losers
of these Pentagon 'turf battles' but instead ran much deeper,
touching the very heart of the individual services' philosophies
on command in war.
These philosophies have been nearly diametrically opposed for
much of the past half century. At one extreme, the U.S. Air
Force, with its espousal of the doctrine of centralized command
and control of both strategic and tactical aviation under a
single air commander, best represents what can be referred to as
the 'unity of command by force type' (land, air, and sea) view.
The Army has generally favored this approach as well, although
its field commanders usually have been reluctant to separate the
post of unified Commander in Chief (CinC) from that of ground (or
land) forces commander.
At the other extreme is the U.S. Navy, which tends to favor
the apportionment of its various air, surface, sub-surface, and
viii
Marine forces into standing task forces - although they remain
under the overall command of the numbered fleet commanders and
oceanic fleet CinCs and can be readily reorganized if required.
This fleet organization best represents the 'unity of command by
area' approach, since the local area or task force commander is
generally given a slice of every element in order to control his
battlespace. The Marine Corps also subscribes to this approach,
yet within its own air-ground task forces, it insists on having
centralized command of both fixed and rotary-winged aviation.
This thesis follows the history of the evolution of the UCP
over the last fifty years with a eye toward its future revision.
Given the fundamentally altered geo-strategic situacion brought
about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the author argues for
a complete revision of the UCP based on distinct post-Cold War
theater and regional missions. Three theater commands - Europe,
Northeast Asia, and Southwest Asia - would exist to lead and
support the narrow, focused mission of coalition defense of these
vital allies. Two broader regional or area commands - Atlantic
and Pacific - would be responsible for the full range of military
activities elsewhere - outside of the theater command boundaries.
The issue of the appropriate role of 'forces commands' in
this framework is also addressed. In contrast to the recently-
instituted consolidation of the bulk of U.S.-based conventional
forces into the U.S. Atlantic Command, the author proposes the
retention of several separate (but joint) 'strategic'
ix
conventional forces to be based on mission, readiness, and
deployability/sustainability criteria.
The result would be four 'strategic' conventional groups of
forces: a Rapid Reaction/Contingency Force, an Atlantic and a
Pacific Expeditionary Force, and a Mobilization/Reinforcing
Force. The Expeditionary Forces would be assigned to the revised
Atlantic and Pacific Commands, while the Rapid Reaction and
Mobilization Forces would remain under the direct control of the
National Command Authority.
An appendix provides an illustrative proposal for revising
service roles and missions. The author maintains that some of
the disputed roles and missions - particularly Close Air Support
(CAS) and long range air defense artillery - are intiw-tely tied
to the larger issue of unity of command, and thus a solution must
be found in that context. The solution proposed is to institu-
tionalize a 'battlefield' split whereby the Army and Marines
would assume control of all CAS and short range air defense
assets, while the Air Force and/or Navy take over control of the
long range (theater) strike and air defense assets.
The net effect of the proposed changes would be to create a
new strategic framework that better reflects the regional focus
and force requirements of the post-Cold War era. Within this
framework, the various theater, regional, and forces commands are
designed to be joint in outlook yet constituted along mission and
functional lines in order that they be fully capable of meeting
the likely warfighting challenges of the Twenty-first Century.
x
I. INTRODUCTION
"Unity of Command" has long been recognized as one of
the key principles under which U.S. military forces in the
field should operate in time of war, yet this principle has
proven to be exceedingly difficult to translate into reality
over much of the last century. As late as 1927, when Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy (JAAN) was revised by the
joint Board of the Army and Navy, coordination and mutual
cooperation were seen to be the normal command relations
between Army and Navy forces, with more formalized but
temporary subordination of one service's forces to the other
(depending on which service had the "paramount" interest) to
be directed only in time of emergency and on an as required
basis. The full subordination of the forces of one service
to those of another was the option of last resort, and only
at the direction of the President.'
The emergence of two factors combined to fundamentally
change this approach to joint command in war. First, the
rise of aviation as an increasingly independent arm of
'see C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control. and the
Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 95-
96.
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service within the Great Powers' military establishments
throughout the 1920s and 1930s served to further blur the
already hazy distinction between where a naval operation
ended and a land campaign began. Not being a continental
power in the traditional sense of the term, the United
States military was largely able to maintain this
artificial separation between the two. With neither Mexico
nor Canada viewed as a serious military threat, the
expectation remained that, aside from a few distant
territories and island outposts in the Pacific, a potential
enemy would be met by the Navy hundreds of miles from U.S.
shores. If the U.S. Fleet was somehow unable to halt an
invasion force after the projected Mahanian-style battle for
command of the sea, then the Army would attempt to defend
U.S. territory through its employment of coastal artillery,
aviation, and - if necessary - mobile ground forces. The
growing range and capabilities of combat aircraft began to
fundamentally alter the expected pattern of conflict, and
air power enthusiasts in both the Army and the Navy began to
argue the case that aviation would be the pre-eminent arm in
both the offense and the defense in wars of the future.
The gathering storm clouds over Europe and the Far East
in the late 1930s proved to be the second and decisive
factor in the transition from mutual cooperation to unity of
command. The speed of Hitler's conquests in Europe, and in
2
particular the Blitzkrieg-style of warfare employed by his
forces, provided proof to many that by the time of the
commencement of hostilities, it was already too late to
develop effective joint command arrangements. The rapidity
of modern war now demanded that unity of command be worked
out ahead of time and that the joint commander be allowed
to employ all the resources at hiL disposal in the execution
of his assigned mission. Unfortunately for the United
States, this lesson was not driven home until a disastrous
string of -- feats was suffered at the hands of Imperial
Japan in December 1941.
In the most infamous of these defeats at Pearl Harbor in
the Hawaiian Islands, the immediate post-mortem analyses
focused on the divided command arrangements for local
defense and the parallel chains of service command that met
only in Washington, D.C. at the White House. Within the
first months of the war, the institution of joint command
was quickly agreed upon between the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army (CSA) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for the
major American overseas territories and bases, yet this
agreement in principle proved to be in many ways the easiest
part of the process. In fact, as the saying goes, 'the
devil was in the details' when it came to the inauguration
of joint command arrangements.
3
Although established under the guise of wartime
necessity, by the end of 1945 it became clear to most senior
military officers that the wartime system of unified command
ought to be maintained in some semblance in the post-war
period. The major problem, as noted above, was in the
nature of the command relationships between the forces of
the various services and the joint commander. Broadly
speaking, there has existed since the Second World War a
fundamental philosophical disagreement between the Naval
Services on the one hand and the Army and the Air Force
on the other, over how forces are to be subordinated to a
unified commander. The Army view in 1945 (and the Air
Force view later) was "that command should be exercised
through service commanders, unifying the great bulk of each
service rather than on the basis of territorial areas as had
been the case during the war". 2 The Navy view, on the other
hand, was that unity of command by area within a unified
command was essential to the successful execution of a
commander's mission.
As it has evolved since then, these two often diverging
preferences of 'command by area' versus 'command by force
type' have helped shape the Unified Command Plan of today.
2James F. Schnabel, The History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Volume
I: 1945-1947, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint
Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979) 173.
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For most of the past fifty years a third element - that of
strategic planning for a global war with the Soviet Union -
has served to divert, restrict, or submerge the essential
friction between these divergent philosophies. With the
demise of the Cold War, the constraints imposed by a
projected global war centered on a multinational coalition
defense of Western Europe have essentially disappeared.
Thus in theory, U.S. strategic planners are now free to
concentrate on a region-by-region approach to unified
command arrangements.
The objective of this thesis is to trace the evolution
of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) since World War II in
order to assess the sources of the changes to the plan over
time. Particular attention is paid in the thesis to the
'command by area' versus the 'command by forces' struggle,
with the impact of coalition warfare against the Axis Powers
and, later, the overlay of war planning against the Soviet
Union accentuated in order to highlight its effects on the
more basic 'area' versus 'forces' contest. Presented for
the reader's consideration at the end is a new proposed
framework for a Unified Command Plan that better addresses
the strategic needs of the United States today and into the
future.
5
1I. THE ORIGINS OF THE SYSTEN OF UNIFIED COIDIAND:
WORLD WAR TWO
A. THE EARLY WAR PERIOD AND UNITY OF COMIAND
Prior to the United States' rather sudden entry into the
Second World War in December of 1941, the issue of "unity of
command" was one that had been the subject of much
professional discussion and had in fact been enshrined as a
principle of war by the Army, with the Navy accepting it (at
least formally) as being equally as valid as "mutual
cooperation". 3 Beyond this universal recognition of the
importance of unity of command in the largely anticipated
war to come, prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities
virtually nothing of substance had been accomplished to
institute a joint command structure in any prospective
theater or region of military operations. To recommend a
unified command structure in theory was all well and good,
but to actually subordinate the operating forces of one
department to the command of the other was beset by problems
of Army-Navy rivalry reaching back almost to the founding
of the republic - and was unheard of during peacetime.
3Allard, 96.
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1. The Development of the Pacific Theater
With tensions between the United States ana Japan on
the rise in 1940 and 1941, the War Department did make
certain adjustments in the command arrangements of its
forces in the Philippines in order (it was hoped) to better
prepare those forces to meet an expected Japanese attack.
Until the summer of 1941, the command of military forces in
the Philippines was divided between the Philippine
Department, which controlled U.S. Army Forces on the islands
and was directly subordinate to the War Department, and the
Philippine Army, which reported to the Commonwealth
Government. In July 1941, President Roosevelt approved the
creation of a new command - the U.S. Army Forces in the Far
East (USAFFE) - and recalled Douglas MacArthur from his
retirement post as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth to
serve as its commander. 4 USAFFE was intended to bring all
U.S. Army and Army Air Corps forces, as well as the
Philippine Army, under unified command, although the U.S.
Asiatic Fleet, which then was based at Manila Bay, was to
4see Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, The United
States Army in World War II: The War Department: Strategic
Plannina for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, 1953) 69.
7
cooperate with MacArthur but remain under direct Navy
command.'
This simple act, taken as a measured response to the
visibly deteriorating diplomatic situation in the Far East,
was to have wide-ranging effects on the establishment of
unified commands later on. 6 Prior to July 1941 (after many
earlier debates), one of the central operating tenants of
Army-Navy war planning was that it would be neither
practical nor possible to hold the Philippines against a
determined Japanese assault. As was agreed to by both the
Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, and his Navy
counterpart, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark,
War Plan RAINBOW 5 called for a general defense of the
Eastern and Central Pacific regions. In the Far East,
the Army would defend the Philippine coastal fron-
tier, but no Army reinforcements would be sent to that
area. The Navy would support the land and air forces in
5see Fleet Admiral Earnest J. King, U.S. Navy at War
1941-1945: Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy
(Washington: United States Navy Department, 1946) 31. From
1 February 1941, the U.S. Navy was organized into the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets. Th senior fleet
CINC was also dual-hatted as CINC U.S. Fleet, "chiefly for
purposes of standardization". On 18 December 1941,
President Roosevelt established CINC U.S. Fleet as a
separate billet, and in March 1942 this billet was in turn
combined with that of the CNO.
6Matloff and Snell, 64-65. The authors note President
Roosevelt's tightening economic embargo of Japan and the
freezing of Japanese assets in the U.S., which was under-
taken in the hopes of pressuring them to evacuate their
military forces from mainland China and French Indochina.
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the defense of the Far Eastern territories of the Associ-
ated Powers, raid Japanese sea communications, and destroy
axis forces. The Commander in Chief, United States
Asiatic Fleet, would be responsible, in co-operation with
the Army, for the defense of the Philippines as long as
that defense continued and, thereafter, for the defense of
the Malay Barrier, but the Navy, like the Army, planned no
reinforcement of its forces in that area. 7
Roosevelt's decision to establish USAFFE under former Army
Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, one which was apparently
undertaken without first consulting the War Department,
fundamentally changed the 'no reinforcement' plan. 8  This
decision was clearly a political one meant to raise the
stakes in the war of nerves with Japan and, although the War
Department planning staff quickly adjusted to the new
circumstances and began to allocate significant resources
for the reinforcement of the Philippines, the expectation
remained that the Japanese would be able to eventually
overcome any American attempt to hold the islands in
the first period of a war.'
The surprise attacks by Japan on December 7 and 8,
1941, which devastated a significant portion of U.S. naval
and air forces in Hawaii and the Far East, added impetus to
the decision to create a joint command in the Pacific.
'Matloff and Snell, 45.
8Matloff and Snell, 67.
9Matloff and Snell, 69.
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Critics of America's military unpreparedness quickly focused
on the awkwardly divided command responsibilities in effect
at the time of the surprise attack in the Hawaiian Islands
as a major factor in the disaster, although the similar
circumstances in the Philippines under a nominally more
unified command were largely ignored."0
In December of 1941, however, both the War and Navy
Departments' more immediate concern was the question of what
strategy to pursue in the Far East. With the abandonment of
the 'no reinforcement' plan several months before, the way
was clear in theory to transfer whatever forces were
available to the Philippines, although the Navy was not
anxious to risk the loss of more ships in support of what
could only be seen as a delaying action." Also
restricting a major effort to hold the Far East was the
nascent grand strategy developed over the course of British
and American military staff talks, which had proceeded
informally for more than a year and had operated under the
"
1
°Matloff and Snell, 81-82. MacArthur, despite several
hours warning after the Pearl Harbor attack, lost almost
half his Air Force in the December 8 air raid by Japanese
forces.
"Matloff and Snell, 69-70. As early as the fall of
1941, the U.S. Navy - in addition to the British, Dutch, and
Australian Navies - voiced their inability to sustain the
Philippines in the face of a war with Japan. The events of
7-8 December 1941 reinforced this view (see Matloff and
Snell, 82, footnote 63.)
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premise that the European Theater would receive the priority
of effort in a war against the Axis." 2 From his headquarters
in Manila, General MacArthur actively sought to promote his
vision of a determined defense of the Philippines, which was
intended both to sustain the hard-pressed forces of the
British Empire and China and to provide the springboard for
the eventual counterattack against Japan."
Although still undecided on a long term military
strategy for the region, President Roosevelt recognized the
need to achieve better strategic coordination between the
U.S. and its partners. As part of this effort, a series of
conferences were held in the Far East in late December 1941
(at Chungking on the 17th and 23rd and at Singapore on the
18th and 20th) to coordinate strategic policy between the
new allies. In a message back to Army Chief of Staff
General Marshall, a senior American participant reported
that the Singapore conference
showed 'an immediate need for one supreme head over
a combined allied staff for detailed coordination of USA
12Matloff and Snell, 34-38.
"
3Matloff and Snell, 84. MacArthur "...declared and
repeated that the battle of the Philippines was the decisive
action of the war in the far Pacific: "If the western
Pacific is to be saved it will have to be saved here and
now"; and again he said, "The Philippines theater of
operations is the locus of victory or defeat." He urged that
authorities in Washington review their strategy with this in
mind..."
11
British Australia and Dutch measures.. .and the strategic
direction of all operations in Pacific area.'
The report went on to recommend the location of a combined
headquarters on Java and indicated that the appointment of
an American as the supreme head of this staff was the
"unofficial" consensus of the participants.15
Driven by the same circumstances, the deteriorating
military situation in the Far East prompted the search for
new bases from which to sustain the fight after the
anticipated fall of the Philippines. War Department
planners immediately focused on Port Darwin in Northern
Australia as the preferred site for an advanced base of
operations and by the middle of December, Brig. Gen. Dwight
Eisenhower, who had been assigned by Marshall the task of
devising a Far East strategy, won both Secretary of War
Stimson's and the Chief of Staff's approval for its further
development.16
Although envisioned primarily as an air base and
commanded initially by an Air Corps officer, "the forces
in Australia thus became the nucleus of a new overseas
command even though they were still part of MacArthur's U.S.
14Matloff and Snell, 87.
"
5Matloff and Snell, 87.
"
6Matloff and Snell, 87.
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Army Forces in the Far East and had their primary mission of
getting vitally needed supplies to the Philippines"." As
the U.S. Army's official history went on to note "it was
evident that the establishment of this new command implied a
more comprehensive strategy in the Southwest Pacific than
the desperate effort to prolong the defense of the
Philippines".18 This decision was to have a profound effect
on the conduct of the war in the Pacific and the command
arrangements under which it would be fought.
The issue of unity of command in Southeast Asia and
the Southwest Pacific was raised in Washington, D.C. during
the last week of December 1941 at the ARCADIA conference,
which was attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister
Churchill, and their principal military advisors. The
British and American Chiefs agreed to the establishment of
the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command under
Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, whose responsibility would
encompass the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya,
and Burma. 19 As proposed by General Marshall, the objective
of this command was
"
7Matloff and Snell, 88.
"
18Matloff and Snell, 88.
"
19Matloff and Snell, 123.
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to place on a single officer responsibility for
initiating action to be taken in Washington and London
with reference to strategic deployment to and within the
area. 20
In order to provide appropriate strategic direction to
Wavell and future combined commanders, a new standing
British-American military committee was established in
Washington consisting of senior officers from both countries
who had been in attendance at ARCADIA. This committee,
titled the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), was to play a
vital part in smoothing out allied military and grand
strategy differences throughout the war.
The issue of the scope of Wavell's authority over
forces assigned to the ABDA Command's area of responsibility
surfaced immediately. Under General Marshall's proposal
(which was soon adopted), the
Allied Commander would have no authority to move
ground forces from one territory to another within the
theater. During the period of "initial reinforcements"
he could move only those air forces that the governments
concerned chose to put at his disposal. He would have no
power to relieve national commanders or their subordi-
nates, to interfere in the tactical organization and
disposition of their forces, to commandeer their supplies,
or to control their communications with their respective
governments. 21
In response to concerns over the amount of limitations
placed on Wavell's exercise of command, Marshall replied
20Matloff and Snell, 124.
"
21Matloff and Snell, 125.
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that
what he proposed was all that could be done, and
declared that "if the supreme commander ended up with no
more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted,
such a situation was better than nothing, and an improve-
ment over the present situation".22
Assuming command of ABDA in mid-January, Wavell was
confronted with the continuing collapse of British and
American defenses in Singapore, Java, and the Philippines.
Identifying Australia and Burma as the vital territory to be
held, Wavell recommended to the CCS the diversion of
resources (an Australian army corps) scheduled for Java to
Burma, on the grounds that they could be quickly and
successfully brought to bear against the Japanese. 23 In
spite of urging by Washington and London that this diversion
proceed, the Australian government flatly refused, citing
the vulnerability of its northern region and the desire to
employ these forces closer to home in order to forestall
further Japanese movement southward. 24 Unable to quickly
shift its meager forces within its area of responsibility,
the ABDA Command was soon forced to both abandon the fight
for southern Burma and evacuate its headquarters from Java,
thus leaving the Dutch to wage their own hopeless struggle
2 2Matloff and Snell, 125.
2 3Matloff and Snell, 128.
24Matloff and Snell, 130-32.
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in the East Indies and signalling the demise of the short-
lived combined command. 2"
With the American position in the Philippines
becoming increasingly untenable as well, thought was given
to the future of MacArthur's command. At the end of
February, Roosevelt made the decision to order MacArthur's
withdrawal from Corrigedor with the intention that he assume
command of American (and allied) forces in Australia in a
reconstituted ABDA Command. 26
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs reexamined command
arrangements in the Pacific area. Working on the assumption
that the world would be subdivided into three major areas -
Pacific, Middle and Far East, and Atlantic/European - and
that the British would accede to the proposal that the
American Joint Chiefs exercise strategic direction over the
Pacific, they were then faced with reconciling the competing
jurisdictional claims between the Army and the Navy. 27 With
an already heavy Army presence in Australia and the
precedence of the ABDA Command fresh in mind, the question
of the subordination of this area to a Supreme Pacific
2 5Matloff and Snell, 135.
2 6Matloff and Snell, 165.
27Matloff and Snell, 166-8.
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Commander appears to never have been seriously considered by
the JCS at the time. Rather, the issue focused on the
appropriate boundaries of this projected 'Australian area'
command. The Navy argued for narrow boundaries encompassing
only the Australian continent and its immediate northern
approaches, while the Army's War Plans Division, now under
Brig. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, sought more expansive ones
including all territory to the north as well as New Zealand
and New Caledonia. 2 8 The JCS compromise between these two
views extended the northward boundary of this "Australian
Area" to include the Philippines but accepted the Navy's
case that New Zealand and New Caledonia were an integral
part of the lines of communication for the entire Pacific
area and as such were a Navy responsibility. Thus, the
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Command was defined first -
largely to fit the future needs of MacArthur's combined
command - and nearly everything to its east and north east,
being defined in what the terms of today refer to as sea
lines of communications (SLOCs), was ceded to the Pacific
Ocean Area (POA) Command. 29
28Matloff and Snell, 168-9.
2 9Matloff and Snell, 168-9. The area of the Pacific
Ocean of the coast of Central and South America remained
under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command, since this area was deemed integral to the
defense of the Panama Canal sea frontier.
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Although they were formally established on the same
day (30 March 1942), SWPA and POA were recognized to be
fundamentally different entities. Douglas MacArthur's
command was to be multi-national in character, and thus his
authority was limited in certain critical ways. Based on
the ABDA experience, the JCS instructed that MacArthur
appoint subordinate combined ground, air, and naval
commanders, thus insulating him from exercising direct
command over U.S. forces with the idea that this would
allow him to better play the role of an honest broker. 3"
The POA Command, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, was
recognized to be an entirely American theater command, and
thus Nimitz was allowed to retain his direct command of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet. His command was subdivided by region,
however, in order that the South Pacific (sub-area)
commander might more easily coordinate his support of the
SWPA. 3 1 Thus, the different titles - Supreme Commander for
MacArthur versus Commander in Chief for Nimitz - pointed up
some important differences in command authority and
flexibility between the two neighboring theaters.
30Matloff and Snell, 171.
31Matloff and Snell, 169.
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2. The Development of the Zuropean Theater
Although not specifically addressed during the
series of staff meetings revolving around the ARCADIA
Conference, the issue of unified command arrangements was
lying just below the surface of the debate over Allied grand
strategy. Sharp differences emerged between the British
approach to strategy, which favored a steady tightening of
siege lines around the southern and eastern edges of Western
Europe along with the material sustainment of the Soviets -
followed by invasion only when the Germans were at the point
of near collapse, and the American, which envisioned a rapid
concentration of forces in the British Isles for an early
invasion of Northwestern Europe. Prior to the outbreak of
war, the American planners' guiding principle was
to emphasize the need for economy of effort in
"subsidiary" theaters. They classified as subsidiary
theaters not only the Far East but also Africa, the
Middle East, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Scandinavian
Peninsula, in accordance with their premise that the
plains of northwest Europe constituted the main theater,
where "we must come to grips with the enemy ground
forces. ,32
The fundamental incompatibility of the two approaches was
quite evident even at this early stage, and the competition
for scarce resources between "subsidiary" theaters and the
main theater was to be a fixture of Allied planning for the
next two and a half years.
1 2Matloff and Snell, 101.
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From the British perspective, the immediate tasks of
the available American forces were to relieve the British
garrisons in Iceland and Northern Ireland and to open up a
second front in North West Africa in the rear of Field
Marshall Erwin Rommel's Panzer Army Africa." Although by
early spring 1942 the questions of if, how, and when
landings in North West Africa (known then as Operation
GYMNAST) were to proceed had not been settled, this course
of action slowly came to be seen by President Roosevelt as
the best option to bring American military forces to bear
quickly against Germans. Citing the potential for a rapid
transformation of the military situation on the Eastern
Front, General Marshall and his staff argued the need to
amass forces in the British Isles (known as BOLERO) in order
to be able to execute a short-notice attack (SLEDGEHAMMER)
across the Channel in late 1942 either to avert a Soviet
defeat or to take advantage of a sudden German collapse
along lines similar to 1918.•4 If circumstances did not
necessitate or offer such a course of action, then the
buildup in Britain would continue towards a mid-1943 full
scale invasion of Northwestern Europe (code named ROUNDUP).
"
3Matloff and Snell, 106-8.
"
34Matloff and Snell, 237.
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In May, while the BOLERO versus GYMNAST debate
simmered, the more mundane question of the command of the
American forces then arriving in the British Isles arose, as
well as the need to establish a combined command in
anticipation of the planned invasion. Recognizing that the
British were unenthusiastic about the prospects of an early
(1943) cross-channel invasion, General Eisenhower on his
return from a conference in England recommended that the
U.S. place an officer there in order to spur the British
along in the planning process. Marshall agreed with
this assessment and within a week, Eisenhower was picked to
fulfill this function and appointed to command the newly-
created European Theater of Operations for the U.S. Army
(ETOUSA). Established on 10 June 1942, ETOUSA was by Army
and Navy agreement a joint command
in which the Army exercised planning and operational
control over all U.S. Navy forces assigned to that
theater. The Commanding General, ETOUSA, was directed
to co-operate with the forces of the British Empire and
other nations but to keep in view the fundamental rule
"that the forces of the U.S. are to be maintained as a
separate and distinct component of the combined forces" .
Encompassing all of Scandinavia, Western Europe (including
the Iberian Peninsula), Germany, and Italy, ETOUSA
represented the American commitment to the BOLERO/ROUNDUP
strategy, and as such it was quickly staffed with key
"
3 5Matloff and Snell, 197.
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subordinate commanders of the likes of Generals Mark Clark
(Ground Forces Commander) and Carl Spaatz (Air Forces
Commander) as well as Rear Admiral Henry Hewitt. 3 6
At the end of July, Roosevelt decided in favor of
the invasion of French North West Africa (now renamed
TORCH), thereby in effect forcing the postponement of a
major cross-channel attack until 1944."v Since the bulk of
the forces to be involved in Operation TORCH were to be
American, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) determined that
the commander of TORCH would be an American and that the 1st
of December would be the latest date for the operation,
although Roosevelt in a separate directive named 30 October
as the by-date. 3" On 26 July, Marshall informed Eisenhower
that he was to be the Commander-in-Chief, Allied
Expeditionary Force for Operation TORCH. 39
The decision to launch TORCH, with projected
landings both on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean
coasts of French North Africa, raised the issue of command
arrangements to the forefront once again. Although the
landings were to be conducted far from the fighting in Libya
"
36Matloff and Snell, 197.
"
3
'Matloff and Snell, 322.
3 8Matloff and Snell, 281.
3 9Matloff and Snell, 287.
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and Egypt, later phases of the campaign naturally envisioned
a link-up between Alexander's forces and those of
Eisenhower. Thus, while starting as essentially two
separate theaters of operations, they would be merged into
one at some point in the future. This begged the question,
driven by the principle of unity of command, of who would be
the commander of this merged theater of operations and what
authority he would possess.
Before the larger theater command decision could be
made, those for the actual operation - ashore and afloat -
were determined in accordance with Eisenhower's desires
to fuse into one integrated force the ground, sea,
and air elements of the two national military establish-
ments. The principle of unity of command required that
the task force attacking each major area should operate
under a single commander and that the entire Allied
Expeditionary Force under the supreme commander should
avoid subdivisions along either national or service lines
which seriously impaired the tactical flexibility.4"
Although it took weeks to finalize, the end result was an
arrangement that managed to remain largely faithful to
Eisenhower's vision:
the American Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary
Force, exercised direct command over the commanding
generals of the [assault] task forces, indirect command
40George F. Howe, The United States Army in World War
II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Northwest
Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History of the United States Army,
1991) 33.
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through a British Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary
Force, over the senior naval commanders of both nationali-
ties, and direct command over land-based aviation through
British and American air force commanders. The task
forces ... were expected to extend their control ashore
and to be consolidated into an American Fifth Army and a
British First Army."
Even after the development of TORCH from an amphibious
assault into a 'mature' theater of operation, Eisenhower
refrained from appointing a separate ground commander,
preferring instead to direct both the overall Allied
operation and the de facto Army Group ashore. This pattern
would be repeated again in the future, although accompanied
then by controversy that was somehow avoided during the
Northwest African campaign.
The rapid reinforcement of Tunisia by Germany in the
wake of TORCH forced a reassessment of the Northwest African
campaign and its timing. The initial period immediately
following the November 1942 landings was spent consolidating
the Allied foothold in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.
With significant German forces in between the Allied
commands in both Libya and Algeria, any consideration of a
rapid link-up between the two quickly faded by December,
although planners looked to the spring of 1943 as the point
where Axis forces finally would be expelled from Africa.
Looking forward to this eventuality, Marshall once again
"4'Howe, 35.
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argued for the need to resume the buildup of U.S. forces in
the British Isles in preparation for an opportune moment to
strike into France. President Roosevelt, however, seeing
some merit in the British argument for a campaign in
Southern Europe, favored a more balanced buildup both in
Britain and in North Africa in order to retain greater
strategic flexibility. 42
At the end of the year, Army planners wt e faced
with three options as to the point of main effort for
military operations in the European Theater in 1943: the
strategic bombing of Germany, a thrust by major ground
forces into Northwestern Europe, or a campaign in Southern
or Southeastern Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The
belief that decisive victory could only be achieved through
the occupation of Germany and the defeat of its army limited
(in the Army and Navy view) the value of an exclusive air
campaign, and British opposition and the diversion of
resources for TORCH severely constrained the second. Given
the perception at home and abroad that the U.S. was finally
fighting against the Germans, "the third alternative -
continued pressure in the Mediterranean region - was the
line of least resistance". Thus,
"
42Matloff and Snell, 364.
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[T]he strategic objectives for 1943 would be to open
the Mediterranean to Allied shipping, and to knock Italy
out of the war. 43
Once this strategy was finalized at the Anglo-
American conference at Casablanca in January 1943, the
question of theater command was quickly decided. Once the
British Eighth Army crossed the Tunisian frontier, Gen.
Eisenhower was to assume the role of Supreme Commander of
the theater, with Gen. Sir Harold Alexander as his deputy
and in direct command of the final battle for Tunisia. Once
Tunisia was secure, Alexander was to be named as the
operational commander for the planned invasion of Sicily.
Eisenhower's authority did not extend to the Eastern
Mediterranean or the Middle East, however; this area was to
remain under British strategic direction."
Related to the changes in theater command
arrangements was the issue of the control of tactical and
strategic air forces. The Army Air Force Commander, Gen.
Henry A. "Hap" Arnold, and his subordinates shared a great
faith that the concentration of air assets and their
centralized direction in a strategic bombing campaign was
the recipe for decisive victory against Germany and Japan.
4 3Matloff and Snell, 366.
"4 Maurice Matloff, The U.S. Army in World War II: The
War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare.
1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History of
the United States Army, 1957) 26.
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In Operation TORCH, command of air forces had been fairly
decentralized. However, problems with air-ground
coordination at points in the campaign, and the Air Corps'
view that air was greatly misused when treated simply as
anotlhe!r supporting arm, combined to strengthen the case for
centralized control of theater air assets under one
commander.4s This line of reasoning prevailed, and with the
reorganization of the theater in February Air Chief Marshall
Sir Arthur W. Tedder became the chief of the Mediterranean
Air Command under Eisenhower, with Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz as
his subordinate in command of the combined Northwest African
Air Force. This logic was extended to naval operations
as well with the appointment of Admiral Sir Andrew B.
Cunningham as Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean."
For the Army Air Force, the further subordination of
the heavy and medium bomber groups under a super-theater
"Howe, 673. The author summarizes the positions as
follows: "Ground commanders generally sought the kind of air
support which General Montgomery had received at El Alamein
and El Hamma, that is, the use of aviation for neutralizing
hostile fires, harassing the enemy, or covering friendly
ground movements." Since that system was not in place, they
sought "specific air units [to] be placed under a ground
commander's direct control." The air argument was (and
still is) that "such an arrangement would be wasteful of air
power in various ways, and might even cost the ground forces
the basic benefit of air superiority."
"46Matloff, 50.
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(Northwest Europe, Mediterranean, and Middle East) bomber
campaign against Germany was the ultimate objective. Since
the Royal Air Force, long a separate service, was a
proponent of the same general theories, the call for a
combined bomber offensive was readily agreed upon, although
U.S. and British views differed sharply as to the correct
tactics for strategic bombing. Agreeing to temporarily
subordinate the strategic direction of the bombing
offensive to British direction (until the U.S. attained the
majority of forces in Europe), the Army Air Force (AAF)
nonetheless insisted that operational control of the U.S.
bomber forces (8th Air Force in Britain and 15th Air Force
in North Africa) remain under a U.S. commander. 41
Before all of the air issues could be settled, the
matter of overall European command needed to be addressed.
Although General Marshall was initially in favor of a
unified theater encompassing the British Isles to the Middle
East under the direction of a Supreme Commander, the needs
of Eisenhower in North Africa temporarily forced a change in
this approach.4' The inability of the Army and Navy to come
to a similar arrangement in the Pacific did not bode well




have to yield the position of Supreme Commander in either
the Pacific or in Europe if this was approved. 4 9
In order to reflect the reality of the combined
Allied command in the Mediterranean, the JCS agreed in
January 1943 to the subdivision of the original European
Theater of Operations (ETO) into a smaller ETO (encompassing
Northwestern Europe), a North African Theater of Operations
(NATO), and a Middle East Theater of Operations.5 0  Lt.
Gen. Frank M. Andrews was made Commanding General of the new
ETO, and Maj. Gen. Louis H. Brereton was put in charge of
the Middle East Theater.
B. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS ON JOINT CONMAND ARRANGEMENTS
1. The Aviation Question: Arm or Separate Service?
Faced with the precedent setting agreements between
the Army leadership and the British over combined command of
Allied forces in the Mediterranean, Army and Navy planners
came under increasing pressure to settle once and for all on
a mutually acceptable definition of joint command. Fighting




branch or "arm" rather than as the separate service that it
was rapidly becoming, the Army insisted that its treatment
of the issue with regard to combined commands was the
correct approach. In April 1943, the Navy abruptly
retreated from its stance and accepted the basic outline for
joint command proposed by the Army. Key points agreed upon
in the compromise were:
a single commander would be designated by the JCS on
the basis of the job to be performed; command peroga-
tives over a joint force were to be exercised as though
the forces involved were all Army or all Navy; the JCS
would send the joint commander major directives relating
to components of the force; the joint commander would not
normally be commander of a component of his force; the
joint commander would be assisted by a joint staff,
representative of the components of his force; and
subsidiary joint forces would be organized on the same
principles.51
The experience of the establishment of MacArthur's command
in the Southwest Pacific, with its emphasis on the isolation
of the Supreme Commander from the direct command of a
subordinate component, clearly had an impact on the
formulation of this compromise, as did the operational and
administrative independence enjoyed by the RAF from the
earliest days of the war.
An important side issue between the Navy and the
Army Air Force was clarified with the agreement in principle




warfare (ASW) would fall under the operational control of
the Atlantic Fleet. This in effect was a recognition by the
AAF that the unique needs of a commander at sea did require
control of land-based aviation units in support of largely
naval missions such as ASW, but in return the Navy agreed
that the land-based bombers under their control would not
engage in strategic bombing missions. 52 This compromise
solidified the Atlantic Fleet's effective control over all
service units operating in the Atlantic Ocean (with the
exception of the western approaches to the British Isles and
the waters immediately adjacent to Northwest Africa), thus
making the Atlantic Fleet a joint command in function if not
in name.
2. The Evolution of Joint Conmand in the Caribbean
Disputes over command issues in the Caribbean and
the Central and South American regions took on a different
form, possibly because of their closeness to home and their
relatively well established positions before the outbreak of
the war. From the time of the passage of the National
Defense Act of 1920, Army forces in overseas U.S.
possessions had been organized into military departments
52Matloff, 49. See also Stetson Conn, Rose C.
Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, The United States Army in
World War II: The Western Hemisohere: Guardina the United
States and Its Outposts (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964) 43.
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whose commanders, like their stateside counterparts,
exercised "full tactical and administrative control over all
Army forces and installations within their areas except for
those specifically exempted". 5 3 Naval Districts were also
created and revised during this period, although unlike the
Army example, the major operational formations were not
subordinated to District Command but instead fell under the
command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet or his
subordinate fleets or squadrons.
As was the case with the parallel and separate chain
of command between Washington, D.C. and the Hawaiian
Department on one hand and the Pacific Fleet and 14th Naval
District on the other, the Panama Canal Department before
the outbreak of hostilities was paired with the 15th Naval
District, although the lack of a resident senior fleet
commander apparently resulted in less complicated inter-
service relations than those experienced in Hawaii.
"
53Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 17.
54Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 330. In January 1941,
when queried by General Marshall on the need for unity of
command in the area, Gen. Van Voorhis, the Commanding
General of the Panama Canal Department, indicated that the
traditional policy of mutual cooperation with his
counterpart at 15th District was sufficient for the time
being and that more formal relations would have to be
settled when the pressing need arose.
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After the fall of France and the Low Countries in
June of 1940, the Army and the Navy began to work toward the
establishment of joint command arrangements in both Hawaii
and Panama, although this process was not completed until
after the Pearl Harbor debacle. The Army sought also to
improve its internal command lines in the Caribbean by
expanding the rather narrow (until then) defensive mission
of the Panama Canal Department to include its seaward
approaches both through the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific
Ocean. What resulted was the establishment of the Caribbean
Defense Command (CDC) on 10 February 1941 and the assumption
of that duty by the CG Panama Canal Department ten days
later.s
The issue of unified command was not completely
settled, however, until the internal command relationships
were settled. This resulted in a minor battle within the
Army itself, with the CG, CDC on one side and the CG, Puerto
Rican Department (who was now a subordinate of his) on the
other, of a dispute concerning the appropriate geographic
subdivision of the command. 56 Further complicating the
55Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 330.
56Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 331. The internal
Army dispute centered on "whether the tactical defenses
should be organized along lines similar to those of the
administrative organization and assigned to the sectors or
be placed in a theater-wide functional grouping under a
single commander..."
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issue was the desire of the Army Air Force to retain direct
control over all Army aviation in the CDC under what today
would be known as a theater air comnander rather than their
direct subordination to the various sector and base
commanders. Although the first CG, CDC (Gen. Van Voorhis)
- against the advice of Gen. Marshall - favored giving
certain sector commanders direct control of both ground and
air assets, he was replaced in August 1941 by his
subordinate air commander, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, who
promptly set about re-organizing the Caribbean Air Force
into a theater air force command headquarters (later to
become the 6th Air Force).5'
Adjacent to the Caribbean Defense Command, Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) Harold Stark in the fall of 1941
proposed the establishment of a unified command under Navy
jurisdiction to be called the Caribbean Coastal Frontier.
This move was opposed by the CDC commander, Gen. Andrews, on
the grounds that his command was the best solution to the
problem of "all-around defense of the area from any
5
'Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 333-335. The authors
relay that Gen. Van Voorhis held to the position "that the
Panama Canal air forces 'should not go beyond the immediate
sphere of their operations... in defense of the canal, for
which they were initially provided" and that these units
"should not 'be looked upon by the War Department as
constituting a force available for operations throughout the
theater'."
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direction".5" The Navy view held sway (although the issue
went all the way up to President Roosevelt), and the
resulting compromise provided for the creation of the
Caribbean Coastal Frontier as a separate unified naval
command while the Panama Coastal Frontier, consisting of the
waters to the east and west of the isthmus, was subordinated
under the CG, CDC.5 9
3. The Resolution of the Anglo-American Dispute
over European Theater Coamand Arrangements
Late in 1943, with the U.S. and Great Britain at a
virtual impasse over the timing and advisability of a cross-
channel assault, the issue of unified command took on a
curious aspect. Up until that point in the war, unified
command arrangements were settled largely as an afterthought
once the basic agreement on combined strategy had been
resolved. 6" In the second half of 1943, however, the
question of future unified commands in the European Theater
took on the trappings of a proxy war between the Allies,
5 8Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 352.
"
59Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 410-11. see also the
unpublished brief entitled Decisions Leading to the
Establishment of Unified Commands (1941-1948), hereafter
referred to as Decisions 41-48, JCS Histories, 15-17.
"
6
°The example of MacArthur's appointment is the
exception, but since it occurred in a theater under the
executive control of the JCS, it - unlike the Atlantic/
European theater, which fell under the CCS - was an
exclusively U.S. decision to make.
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with the shape of the combined theaters and the nationality
of their commanders threatening to decide issues of grand
strategy.
The Mediterranean proved to be the test case, with
the British Chiefs' proposal in November to unify the entire
area under one Allied commander. Their argument was that it
"would give greater flexibility to operations in the
Mediterranean and would place under the CCS the additional
forces available in the Middle East" .61 General Marshall
and his staff, however, viewed this as simply a ploy to
allow the British, who had insufficient forces in the Middle
East to launch contemplated assaults against Greece and
Yugoslavia, to gain the necessary resources to go ahead with
these plans. Frustraced at what he saw as an already
wasteful scattering of precious ground and air forces in the
Mediterranean, Marshall proposed that
the JCS take the position that a supreme commander
be designated for all British-American operations against
Germany. Under such a commander were to be appointed an
over-all comu'ander for northwestern European operations
and an over-all commander for southern European opera-
tions, the latter to be responsible for all operations in
the Mediterranean. 6 2
Anticipating British resistance to such a proposal, the Army




not agreeing to any changes in Mediterranean command changes
until (1) the issue of grand strategy was firmly resolved
and (2) the related issue of "the responsibilities of the
over-all commander in the United Kingdom, the command setup
for the U.S. Air Forces, and the control over resources in
the Middle East should be determined. 63
C. UNIFIED COMMAND INTHE LATE WAR PERIOD
1. OVERLORD and the European Theater of Operations
In Europe, the rapid conquest of Sicily and the
subsequent Allied landings on the Italian mainland in mid-
1943 conformed largely to the British Chiefs of Staff view
of the appropriate grand strategy for the war against
Hitler, but the operational stalemate that quickly formed in
the drive up the peninsula lent decisive weight to the
American argument that the only way to end the war in 1944
or 1945 was to strike directly into Northwestern Europe.
Faced with their national preferences and the stalemate on
the Italian front, the Allied leaders met in Cairo (the
SEXTANT talks) in December to attempt to work out a mutually
agreeable grand strategy for 1944 and beyond.
63Matloff, 274.
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At Cairo, strategic realities, a critical shortage
of landing craft, and the agreement to maintain the Combined
Bomber Offensive against the German industrial heartland as
the highest priority paved the way for the decision to
launch a cross-channel assault in May of 1944. Once an
agreement was reached on the prioritization of Northwest
Europe over Southern Europe, the Joint Chiefs were willing
to settle for the division of the European theater into
separate northwestern and southern theaters of operations.
Given that in preparation for the invasion of France, many
of the American forces in the Mediterranean would be
redeployed to the British Isles and thus the theater (with
the addition of the Middle East) would become a
predominately British show, it was agreed that a British
officer would be nominated by Churchill for the post of
Supreme Commander, Mediterranean. Likewise, the anticipated
majority of American forces in the attack into France
dictated that an American be placed in charge. On 5
December 1943, Roosevelt chose Eisenhower for the position
of Supreme Commander of the projected operation, by then
known as OVERLORD. 6 4
Eisenhower's plan for the structure of his command
largely followed the outline of his North African and
"64Matloff, 381.
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Italian experiences, with some notable differences. As was
his preference, naval forces in support of OVERLORD were to
be placed under the combined command of a British officer,
Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay. 65 Instead of a single
combined air forces command, however, there were to be two,
due to the tug of war between the continuing high priority
given to the Combined Bomber Offensive versus recognition
that the tactical air forces might be unable to
support the fighting in France until advance bases were
established. Although he wanted full control over both
tactical and strategic air forces, Eisenhower settled for
the formation of an Allied Expeditionary Air Force
(consisting of the U.S. 9th Air Force and the RAF Tactical
Air Force, to be commanded by Air Chief Marshall Leigh-
Mallory) to be fully subordinated to him, and the temporary
control as OVERLORD approached of the British Bomber Command
and the newly created United States Strategic Air Forces
(USSTAF, consisting of the 8th Air Force and the 15th Air
Force, under Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz)."
With the projected employment of two Army Groups in
France within a few months of the invasion, the issue of an
6 5Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army in World War
II: The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command,
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, 1954) 46-47.
"6 Pogue, 48.
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overall ground forces commander was raised late in 1943. It
was eventually determined that the commander of the British
21st Army Group, which was to be established ashore before
the American 12th Army Group, would exercise operational
control of all Allied forces ashore until the 12th Army
Group headquarters (HQ) was activated. Upon its activation,
both Army Groups would fall under the direct command of
Eisenhower, who intended to have his forward HQ established
in France by then. 6" Thus, Eisenhower held to his
previously developed preference for the direct command of
several major ground formations, in addition to his command
over preferably combined air and naval formations, rather
than for the appointment of a separate combined ground
forces commander.
By October of 1944, with Allied forces firmly ashore
in France and the Tactical Air Forces operating from advance
bases, further modifications of command arrangements were
made. With the reassignment of Leigh-Mallory to Southeast
Asia, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces Command was
disestablished, and the 9th Air Force and the RAF Tactical
Air Force came under the direct command of Eisenhower,
although they received taskings directly from their




of 1944 as well that Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery,
Commanding General of the British 21st Army Group,
repeatedly called for the establishment of a separate
Combined Ground Forces Commander under the Supreme Commander
who would be responsible for the conduct of the ground
campaign in France. This plan would consolidate the
command of the 21st, 12th, and (later) 6th Army Groups under
a principal subordinate (read Montgomery), thus in theory
allowing the Supreme Commander to distance himself from
the day-to-day operations of these forces and to focus
instead on the 'strategic' direction of the land, sea, and
air campaign closing in on Germany from the West.
Eisenhower again rejected this approach, preferring instead
to retain direct command of his major ground formations in
addition to controlling the overall strategic campaign in
68Northwestern Europe.
The subordination of the 6th U.S. Army Group to
Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters after its drive up the
Rhone River Valley from southern France (with its
provisional Tactical Air Force in support) completed the
final major reorganization of the Allied forces before the
68see David Eisenhower, Eisenhower At War 1941-1945
(New York: Vintage Books, 1987) 421-23.
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German surrender in May 1945.69 With the cessation of
hostilities against Germany, Eisenhower received a new
mandate from the Joint Chiefs in June in which he was to
serve as the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European
Theater in addition to his duties as Military Governor,
thereby preserving American unity of command in Europe.7 0
2. Unity of Co•xnd and the End of the War in the
Pacific
Throughout the first three years of the war in the
Pacific, Admiral King and his subordinates had argued
vigorously but to no avail for the unification of the
Pacific theater under the command of Admiral Nimitz. For
many reasons, including the JCS calculation that an American
might not be able to hold the key position of Supreme
Commander in both a single united Pacific Theater and a
united European Theater, this consolidation was never
ordered by the JCS, but the issue remained under review.7 '
"
69Pogue, 455. See the chart on this page for the
depiction of the 1 May 1945 Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF)
Operatironal Chain of Command.
70see JCS Special Historical Study entitled History of
the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, (Washington, D.C.:





The settling of Allied command arrangements with the
division of Europe into two theaters in late 1943 reduced
the pressure to unify the effort in the Pacific for a while,
but by late 1944 it became increasingly obvious that a
merging of the war effort against Japan would be necessary
at some point. With MacArthur's drive from Australia
culminating in the recapture of the Philippines and Nimitz'
conquest of the Central Pacific island chains, Formosa and
Okinawa became obvious targets for their respective
commands, but after that logic dictated a single commander
for the assault on the Japanese home islands. In the spring
of 1945, "... the joint planners prepared detailed plans for
the assault on Kyushu (coded OLYMPIC) scheduled for 1
November 1945, and for the final descent upon Honshu, set
for 1 March 1946".2
As a precursor to the assault, the JCS once again
revisited the issue of unity of command. In February,
General Marshall recommended to the JCS that command cf
service forces be returned to their respective senior
commanders in the Pacific, and that command of further
operations against Japan should be designated on a case-by-
case basis. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, also
indicated the desire for the unification of the Pacific, but
72Matloff, 536.
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he argued for coequal land, sea, and air component
commanders under one Supremv Commander. In the case that a
co-equal air commander was not approved by the JCS, General
Arnold requested that the Twentieth Air Force in the Pacific
be kept under the direct control of the JCS. 73
Following largely along the lines recommended by
Marshall, the JCS in April made modifications to the command
arrangements in the Pacific whereby MacArthur became the
commander of all U.S. Army forces in the region and Nimitz
the commander of all naval forces. Each was charged with
making his forces available for operations against Japan as
directed by the JCS, although no mention of who was to
command the operation was made. CINCPOA, believing that the
lack of a modification to his basic wartime area of
responsibility meant that the Army forces in his area should
remain under his direct command, strenuously objected to the
new directive from the JCS.7 4
As for the specific unified command arrangements for
the planned assault against Japan,
[I]n May 1945 the JCS issued a directive charging
MacArthur with conduct of the campaign against Kyushu
and Nimitz with the responsibility for the naval and
amphibious phases of the operation.7"





The use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August and the subsequent Japanese surrender obviated the
need for the final unification of the Pacific. In its wake,
MacArthur quickly assumed his duties as Commander of
Occupation Forces and Military Governor of Japan, and Nimitz
assumed a less visible role overseeing the transportation
and demobilization of the massive American forces in the
Pacific and the internship of Japanese forces throughout the
vast region. However, the JCS directive of April 1945
remained in effect, setting the stage for the first of a
series of post-war debates on the appropriate internal
structure of a unified command." 6
3. World War I1: An Assoesment
The Second World War experience profoundly changed
the outlook of both the Army and the Navy concerning the
issue of unity of command. Each recognized that the pre-
war tradition of "mutual cooperation" was dead and gone, but
it remained to be seen exactly how a new pattern of unified
command would be put into practice.
The Navy carried away from the war the belief that
its scattered numbered fleets and task forces functioned
best under the centralized command of the Atlantic and




constituted natural geographic areas of responsibility
(AORs) that were highly distinct - and thus required a
separate but still unified command structure - from the
continental theaters of Europe and Asia. Following the
precedent of the Pacific Ocean Area Command, within these
oceanic theaters, subordinate joint task forces operating
within sub-unified area commands could be assembled to
execute the campaigns and operations as the situation
dictated.
The Army and Army Air Force also possessed
viewpoints validated (in their eyes) by wartime experience
concerning the most efficient way to manage and command
their forces within a unified theater. The Army leadership
- aside from MacArthur - had developed during the war a
preference to combine the posts of CINC and Ground Forces
Commander in such a way that skewed the developing "holy
trinity" concept of co-equal ground, air, and naval
component commanders in a theater of war. The Army Air
Force did not argue with this "Eisenhower" approach to
internal theater command arrangements as long as, within
that theater structure, "unity of command" of the air war
was established - under Army Air Corps direction.
Further complicating inter-service relations at
war's end was the emerging institutional independence of the
Air Force and its thinly-veiled desire to bring under its
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domain all or most of the tactical and strategic aviation of
the United States. This, of course, directly threatened the
structure and, possibly, the very existence of the Navy and
Marine Air arms that were the result of almost three decades
worth of effort and whose wartime performance had - in the
sea services' eyes - validated their existence at least as
well as the Army Air Corps' strategic bombing campaign.
Although the Navy and the Marine Corps were to emerge by the
end of the decade with their air arms under-funded though
doctrinally intact, the acrimony and bloodletting of the
post-war defense unification battle would weigh heavily on
unified command issues for years afterward.
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111. T1 ESTABLISHHENT AND EVOLUTION OF
THE UNIFIZD COIMMAND PLAN 1946-1986
A. THE IMMIDIATZ POST-WAR PERIOD
The debates over the shape of the unified command
structure in the year and a half following VJ day are of
particular interest to the strategic planners of the 1990s,
because they provide a refreshingly honest record of the
differences between the various services that is largely
devoid of any mention of the 'global communist threat' that
was soon to overlay almost every aspect of war planning for
almost half a century. In many ways the concerns expressed
then by the services and the CinCs are again relevant in the
post-Cold War strategic environment. Thus, a careful review
of the immediate post-World War II positions on unified
command is particularly important for this study.
1. The Post-War Pacific Turf Battle
From the end of the war against Japan in August 1945
until the adoption of a formal unified command plan in
December 1946, the major source of inter-service contention
was the structure of the system of joint command in the
Pacific region. The April 1945 directive by the JCS
returning command of service components to the senior Army
and Navy commanders in the region continued to prove a
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source of ire to Admiral Nimitz. In February 1946 the
CNO again raised the issue of Pacific command to the JCS,
arguing that the JCS directive of April 1945 had created an
"ambiguous situation in POA with respect to defensive
responsibilities" and as an example pointed to the problem
of Army air defense units in POA responding to directives
from MacArthur, whose headquarters was in Japan. 77 To the
Navy, this confused command situation seemed to invite
another Pearl Harbor-type of debacle.7 8
The CNO's solution to this perceived problem was to
establish a separate unified theater encompassing Japan,
China, and Korea, with the rest of the Pacific "constituted
under a single commander with headquarters in Hawaii, who,
assisted by a joint staff, would exercise unity of command
of all U.S. forces in the area...".71 The Joint Chiefs were
unable to agree on this proposal, and they once again
postponed for the time being action to resolve the issue.
2. The Outline Conmazad Plan
In July 1946 the Pearl Harbor Congressional
Committee published its findings, which as expected,
recommended the immediate institution of unity of command





throughout all military and naval bases overseas. Under
this increased pressure for action, service planners
representing both the Navy and the War Departments sought to
fashion a solution consistent with the major findings of the
report. Areas of agreement included (1) the institution of
unified command in established theaters, (2) the provision
of a joint staff for each unified theater, (3) the JCS
should be the arbiter of any major transfer of forces
between theaters, and (4) service components were free to
communicate with their service headquarters concerning
matters of administration, training, and supply. 80 Areas of
disagreement again included the number and the geographic
boundaries of unified commands in the Pacific region.
Queried again on their opinions concerning Pacific command
arrangements, Gen. MacArthur maintained that the Pacific
"was a single strategic area and that its geographical
division into two command components was unsound" and he
"opposed any compartmentalization which would separate the
central from the western area of the Pacific". In
particular, MacArthur objected to the "lack of depth of area
under the command of the western Pacific commander" that





8 1Decisions 41-48, 37-38.
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Admiral Towers, who was Nimitz' replacement in
Hawaii after the latter's elevation to CNO, favored the
dissolution of CINCPOA and the division of the Pacific into
Western and Central Theaters. Unlike MacArthur, he felt
that Alaska should be included as part of the Pacific area
and that it should fall under the area of responsibility of
the Central Pacific Theater, which would also control the
Pacific Fleet. 82
In response to Gen. MacArthur's opposition to the
division of the Pacific area, JCS Chairman Adm. Leahy in
early September forwarded a memorandum to Gen. Eisenhower,
Marshall's replacement as the Army Chief of Staff, in which
he put forward his views on the issue:
If MacArthur's theory of Command for a General War
in the Pacific is correct, and I cannot as yet accept it
as correct, it could be placed in operation in [an]
emergency at any time by combining MacArthur's present
area and the Central Pacific area under one commander if
a rare military genius should be available and considered
capable of conducting operations at the same time in
China, Alaska, and all the islands of the Pacific Ocean,
and possibly elsewhere. Combined efforts of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff during the last war encountered great
difficulty in supervising much more restricted
operations.8 3 (emphasis mine)
In an attempt to break Lhe impasse over command
relationships in the Pacific, Gen. Eisenhower on 17






'Outline Command Plan' that delineated responsibility for
all overseas forces to a group of Unified Commands. Under
the proposal, six unified commands would be created:
(1) Western Pacific (to include China, Korea,








Each would be staffed jointly and would be directly
responsible to the JCS, and under each CinC would be
subordinate service component commanders who would be
entitled to deal freely with their service headquarters on
non-joint matters such as training, administration, and
supply. 84
Admiral Nimitz objected to several aspects of
Eisenhower's proposals. With postwar naval strength
declining precipitously, Nimitz argued that major fleet task
forces should not be tethered permanently to a particular
theater of war, but rather that they should be temporarily
detailed to a CINC on an as-required basis. He used the
comparison of naval task forces with the nascent developing
84Schnabel, 177-178.
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strategic air forces concept, describing both as providing
essentially similar 'strategic' reach. He thus maintained
that numbered fleets and task forces should be supported by
CINCs in the way that strategic air forces were to be
supported, but in addition he asked that the major fleets be
assigned unified command responsibilities for the broad
oceanic areas adjacent to the U.S. mainland and its
territories.
Nimitz in early October followed up his criticism
with a unified command proposal of his own, which sought to
establish eight commands:
(1) Far East Theater
(2) Pacific Ocean Theater
(3) Alaskan Defense Command
(4) Northeast Defense Command




Although no formal action was taken on this proposal, it is
instructive on the Navy's thinking at this period in the





In late October 1946, designated operations deputies
from the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force presented a
compromise plan on which it was hoped the basis for a
satisfactory solution to the problem could be found. Its
broad outlines were as follows:
(1) Far East/ Western Pacific Command






The Navy had several relatively minor reservations with the
plan, primarily dealing with the inclusion of the Bonins and
the Marianas in the Far East/Western Pacific Command. The
Navy's stand was supported by JCS Chairman Admiral Leahy,
who felt that in an emergency these islands could be readily
transferred to the Far East Command if required.8"
Another factor complicating the resolution of the
problem was a last-minute proposal by Gen. Spaatz, Arnold's
successor as CG, Army Air Forces, which sought to place the
Alaskan and Northeast Commands in a supporting position to




implication that other theater CINCs as well could be placed
in such a subordinate position to an Army Air Force command,
and thus Nimitz demanded clarification of SAC's authority
and responsibility relating to other CinCs. A compromise
was quickly forged by Eisenhower whereby the JCS, and not
CG, SAC, was to direct required support by theater CINCs and
it was clarified that SAC did not own the air forces of
theater CinCs. In regard to the Bonins and Marianas, they
would belong to the Far East Command, but purely naval
supporting functions located there would remain under the
control of the Pacific Fleet. China would fall under the
direct purview of the JCS except under an emergency, when
CinC Far East Command would assume responsibility for and
control of this area. 88
Thus, the JCS proposal presented to President Truman
on 12 December 1946 was as follows:
(1) Far East Command (included Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus,
the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins)
(2) Pacific Command
(3) Alaskan Command








In addition, the Strategic Air Command, which was to include
all U.S.-based strategic air forces, was established under
the direct control of the JCS.8 9 Other major aspects of the
plan included the formalization of the role of the JCS in
its exercise of the "strategic direction over all elements
of the armed forces" as well as the provision that all
forces not specifically assigned to a theater CinC would
"remain under the operational control of the respective
services" 90
In accordance with the plan, the Far East, Pacific,
and Alaskan Commands were brought into being on 1 January
1947. On March 15, the European Command was established, as
was the Atlantic Fleet on 1 November (subsequently renamed
on 1 December 1947 as the Atlantic Command, then with joint
responsibilities), while the Northeast Command was not stood
up until late 1950.91 At the suggestion of the CNO, a naval
specified command entitled Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval
Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (with the acronym







established in November 1947 under the direct control of the
JCS, and in 1948 it was given authority for "joint planning
at the theater level" in its area of responsibility. 92
3. The National Security Act of 1947
and ita Amendmenta
Running concurrently with the post-war debate over
the structure of the UCP was a larger action within Congress
and the Executive Branch to incorporate into law those
aspects of the recent wartime experience that had proven to
contribute to the successful strategic direction and command
of forces in the field. Thus, with the passage of the
National Security Act of 1947, the make-up and the
activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given -egal
standing, although the creation of the post of Secretary of
Defense served to separate the functions of command and
strategic planning, with the former being vested (initially,
to a vague and limited degree) in the office of the
Secretary and the latter in the Joint Chiefs. Among the
duties assigned by the Act to the Joint Chiefs were,
"....subject to the authority and direction of the President
and the Secretary of Defense..."
(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the
strategic direction of the military forces;
92HistorV of the Unified Command Plan. 1946-1977, 5-8.
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(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the
military services logistic responsibilities in accordance
with such plans; and,
(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when
such unified commands are in the interest of national
security.93
The position of Chief of Staff to the President was
formalized - but not mandated - by the legislation, and the
U.S. Air Force was established as a separate department and
service, completing a process that had started well before
the outbreak of the war.
The 1947 Act left several matters seriously out of
balance, particularly the continuing power of the service
departments relative to a manpower- and resource-poor
Defense Secretariat. Thus, in 1949, at the urging of
Secretary Forrestal and others, President Truman proposed
several amendments to the Act. The most significant ones
included the full subordination of the service departments
to the Secretary of Defense, as well as the creation of a
presiding (although non-voting) Chairman of the JCS in place
of the Chief of Staff to the President. 94
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B. THU KOREAN WAR AND ITS IMPACT
As the unified command plan had evolved throughout the
immediate post-war period, so had a fundamentally different
geo-strategic situation with which the U.S. leadership was
forced to come to terms. No longer would America be able
to draw back to a narrow hemispheric defense policy. The
hardening of post-war occupation zones in Europe and the
defeat of the Nationalist Chinese in the Far East and their
subsequent retreat to Formosa contributed to slow the
demobilization of the U.S. military and served to involve
theater CinCs in day-to-day security and military issues
that took on a character altogether different from the
"peacetime" operations of a decade before. The Unified
Command Plan had entered the age of the Cold War.
.. The Far Eastern Command at War
The invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950
provided the first wartime test of the Unified Command Plan
since its inception in 1946. Although much of mainland
Northeast Asia had been removed from the Far Eastern
Command's (FECOM) area of responsibility in February 1950,
it was quickly restored to MacArthur's portfolio at the
outbreak of hostilities. In view of its close proximity
to the fighting, FECOM was seen as the logical headquarters
through which to deal with the crisis on the Korean
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Peninsula. This decision was formalized on 10 July with
President Truman's directive to MacArthur assigning him as
commander of the United Nations' effort to resist the North
Korean assault. 95
FECOM under MacArthur was organized as prescribed by
the UCP of 1946, with some notable exceptions. Separate
subordinate air and naval components were established in the
form of Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (CG FEAF)
and Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE), but
MacArthur retained for himself the post of Commanding
General, Army Forces Far East (CG AFFE) in addition to his
position as theater CinC. The theater staff remained
"essentially an Army staff, except for a Joint Strategic
Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) which had Air Force
and Navy representation".96
For operations in South Korea during the first
months of the conflict, MacArthur deputized the CG, 8th
Army, Lt.Gen. Walton Walker, as the on-scene 'joint'
commander of the forces in the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur
exercised overall strategic direction of the air and naval
campaign against the north, as well as the amphibious
assault spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division of X Corps
95History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 14.
96History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 15.
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against the North Korean communications during the Inchon-
Seoul campaign in September. 97
2. The Air Force - Marine Corps Dispute over
Control of Tactical Aviation
Following the Chinese intervention of November
and the subsequent retreat of American forces below Seoul,
Marine ground and aviation forces, which had been largely
kept separate from the 8th Army as part of the independent X
Corps organization controlled by MacArthur, were now brought
under the 8th Army's direct command. There then arose to
the surface the first of a series of disputes that have
continued in one form or another to the present day over the
operational control of Marine aviation. The Marines
proclaimed the doctrine of air-ground integration, which
was modeled closely along naval task force organization
lines (except that it was envisioned as a permanent entity),
while the Air Force insisted that unity of effort in the air
campaign demanded that the senior air commander have the
flexibility to employ all the air assets in theater as he
saw fit.
This evolution of the 'unity by area' versus 'unity by
force type' conflict tended to boil down to the Marine
9 1see Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States
Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967) 514-15.
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desire for responsive close air support for its ground units
versus the Air Force preference for a concentrated strategic
air interdiction campaign. The decision tilted increasingly
in favor of the Air Force position as the war stretched into
1951, especially after MacArthur's relief in April and his
replacement as United Nations commander by Gen. Matthew
Ridgeway. Thus, the First Marine Division found itself
shuttling between the various Army corps commands under the
Eighth Army as the changing tactical situation dictated,
while its partnered First Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)
became increasingly integrated into the Fifth Air Force's
order of battle in support of its air interdiction
campaign. 98 The situation only improved (from the Marine
perspective) when, in response to the limited success of the
interdiction campaign, the Fifth Air Force in late 1952
"returned most operational planning responsibilities to the
1st MAW", which resulted in 1st MAW then providing "about 40
98see Robert Debs Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The
United States Marine CorDs. 1775-1962, (Baltimore: The
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1991) 576-
577. Colonel Heinl, a Marine, writes: "In the initial
operations, at General MacArthur's specific direction,
Marine air had properly been ordered to support the Marine
ground troops as an air-ground team. By 1951, unfortunate-
ly, other counsels prevailed, and, when the wing resumed
active work, it was assigned to Fifth Air Force, placed
under centralized control, and used in general support of
the Eighth Army as a whole".
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percent of all [CAS] strikes along the entire Eighth Army
front" in the last period of the war. 99
3. Late-War and Post-War Changes to the UCP
At the theater level, several changes of
significance were instituted. Conforming to the Navy's
initial desires in 1946, the Bonin and Marianas Islands were
transferred from CINCFE's to CINCPAC's area of
responsibility in April 1951, as were the Volcano Islands.
The Philippines, the Pescadores, and Formosa followed later
in the year, and thus by 1952 the Far East Command's
geographic base had shrunk to the area immediately
surrounding Japan and the Korean Peninsula."'0 Additionally,
the Army component of FECOM had finally been split off into
a separate headquarters element, and the billets remaining
at the FECOM staff were redistributed to reflect a more
joint outlook."0 '
99see Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of
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C. THU 1956 R.ORGANIZATION OF THZ UNIFIZED COMNKAN
PXA• AND ITS IMPACT
1. The Problem and Service' Positions: JCS 1259/348
In conjunction with a March 1955 review of the
UCP, the Secretary of Defense directed the JCS to
keep the subject of unified commands under continuous
review, recommend changes therein that will simplify and
make more effective the unified command structure in the
light of changing world conditions, and make a report on
the subject to him not less often than annually. 102
In March 1956 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee assembled
a document (JCS 1259/348) that reflected the divergent
opinions of the four armed services concerning the future
shape of the UCP. In regard to the number of unified
commands, it summarized the various service positions at the
outset of the debate as follows:
Army View Navy-Marine Corps View Air Force View
(1) European (1) European (1) European
(2) Atlantic (2) Atlantic (2) Atlantic
(3) Alaskan (3) Alaskan (3) Alaskan
(4) Pacific (4) Pacific(to incl. (4) Pacific (to
(5) Far East the Far East) incl.the Far East)
(6) Caribbean (5) Caribbean
Thus, all agreed on the disestablishment of the Northeast
Command, while the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force wanted
also to roll up the Far East Command under the Pacific
102Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the
Joint Chiefs of '7taff on Unified Command Plan (JCS 1259/348)
of 9 March 1956, pps. 2052-2112, hereafter referred to as
JCS 1259/348, 2053.
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Command, and the Navy and Marine Corps sought to do the same
with the Caribbean Command by its absorption into the
Atlantic Command."0 3 The Army desired to expand the AOR of
Caribbean Command to include all of Central and South
America as well as the Antilles island chain while the Army
and Air Force sought to transform both CINCNELM and CINC
USAFE from specified commands to subordinate service
components of European Command.10 4
To delve further into the services' positions on
this issue provides the reader with a great deal of insight
on the roots of the diverse views on the subject. In the
case of the Far East Command (FECOM), where the Navy-Marine-
Air Force solution was to merge it under PACOM and create a
separate CinC United Nations Command (CINCUNC) in South
Korea, the Army's solution was to expand the AOR of FECOM to
include all of East and Southeast Asia in order to create a
"single unified command covering the entire forward area of
contact with the potential enemy".1 ' As can be seen, the
Army's primary focus was on a unitary enemy (communism)
throughout the theater rather than on the local defense of
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defense of FECOM. The Army objected that the proposed
realignment would create a
divided military command over military forces in the
Japan-Korea area. CINCUNC would retain responsibility
for operations in Korea but command of supporting air
and naval forces based in Japan would be vested in a
commander located in Hawaii. 106
Also, the Army felt that U.S. prestige in the area would be
at risk:
Consideration must be given to the singular respon-
sibilities of CINCUNC and the importance, politically
and psychologically, as well as militarily, of the
continued maintenance of CINCUNC's position and prestige.
Division of CINCFE-CINCUNC responsibilities would automa-
tically decrease the position and prestige of CINCUNC
since he would no longer be the over-all United States
military commander in the area.107
The majority view focused on two key points in favor of the
merging of FECOM and PACOM:
(a) the desirability of eliminating the divided
command of the limited U.S. forces available in the
general area, and (b) the downward trend in the magni-
tude of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea.'" 8
Another major disagreement presented in JCS 1259/348
was centered on the disbandment of CINCNELM. The Army and
Air Force were in general agreement that naval forces in the
region should operate under EUCOM and/or LANTCOM, while the
Navy and the Marine Corps maintained that NELM had a
1 06 JCS 1259/348, 2062-2063.
10 7 JCS 1259/348, 2063-2064.
108JCS 1259/348, 2058.
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legitimate mission, especially in light of the (at the time)
growing Arab-Israeli conflict. Even then, the Navy and
Marine Corps desired only to maintain NELM as a specified
command until "the ultimate organization of a Middle East
Command is decided upon and activated", at which time NELM
would be stood down.' 0 9
The third area of disagreement, which was whether to
enlarge or reduce the Caribbean Command, found the services
split along predictable lines. According to the Navy and
the Marine Corps,
[T]he military and strategic situation does not
justify the continuation of a unified command in the
Caribbean. The threat to the U.S. and to the Panama
Canal and military operations which eventuate therefrom
are not expected to require deployment of major U.S.
forces in the area. Therefore, it is considered that
U.S. interests can be adequately served by assigning
CINCLANT responsibility for defending the U.S. against
attack through the Caribbean... and by assigning respon-
sibility for the defense of the Panama Canal to the
Department of the Army.110
The Army, as the executive agent for CARIBCOM, argued for
its expansion to include all of Latin America based on the
"increasing political and economic importance of this area
to the U.S. and its Allies" while the Air Force preferred to




the south remaining unassigned but with the Caribbean Sea
reassigned to CINCLANT.n'
2. The Final Product: JCS 1259/350
After digesting both the services' and the unified
CinCs' feedback to the discussion outlined in JCS 1259/348,
the Chairman of the JCS issued a memorandum in April 1956
(JCS 1259/350) in which he put forth his own proposal on the
subject. He sought a streamlining of the existing command
structure through the reduction of the Unified Commands to
four: (1) European, (2) Atlantic, (3) Pacific, and (4)
Caribbean. The Caribbean Command would be expanded along
the lines proposed by the Army, with the assignment of
"bases and sea approaches in the Caribbean" to CINCLANT.
The Chairman further maintained that "[A]dvantage should be
taken of every opportunity to appoint CINCARIB as the
senior U.S. military representative in military and
political/military negotiations and dealings between the
United States and Central or South American countries". He




and the Continental Air Defense Command as a joint
command. " 2
The Chairman's proposal was largely acceptable to
both the Army and the Air Force, even though they would lose
command billets (ALCOM and NECOM) as a result."' The Navy,
however, had serious misgivings about the plan and the
'service politics' that it implied. Seeing no military
necessity for the enlargement (let alone the existence) of
the Caribbean Command, one internal Navy memorandum framed
the problem in this manner:
In respect to the overall picture, the recommenda-
tion of JCS 1259/350 to enlarge CINCARIB (quiet, rear
area) and disestablish CINCNELM (a potentially active
area) should be considered in context. If it is impor-
tant to have each military department with two commands,
some means other than the enlargement of CINCARIB should
be utilized."'
The author of this memorandum went on to recommend that the
CNO agree with the disestablishment of FECOM, ALCOM, and
NECOM but oppose both the expansion of CARIB and the
disestablishment of NELM, in the case of the latter until
"satisfactory arrangements are made for continuing the
"12Memorandum by the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Unified Command Plan (hereafter
referred to as JCS 1259/350), 6 April 1956, 2119-2120.
"1 3JCS 1259/350, 2119-2120.
14see Memorandum from the Director, Strategic Plans
Division Op-602C1/rla, Ser 0111P60 dated 9 April 1956
(subject JCS 1259/350) 2.
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planning and operational tasks now being carried ott by
CINCNELM".11
Despite the services' objections noted above, the
Secretary of Defense accepted the majority of the Chairman's
recommendations except in regard to ALCOM, which was reduced
in responsibilities but nevertheless retained as a unified
command, and CARIBCOM, whose AOR remained restricted to
Central America (for the time being),.6 NELM managed to
retain its status as a specified command with its own AOR,
but it was also tasked as the subordinate naval component
for CINCEUR.1 7 A significant change in policy occurred when
the Secretary of Defense instructed that, from that point
forward, "unless specifically authorized, no unified
commander was to exercise direct command of a subordinate
force", a move which resulted in the establishment of the
separate billet of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) as the naval component commander under
CINCPAC in January 1958.18
In September of 1957, the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) was established, bringing the air defense
"
1 5Memorandum, 4.
"1 6History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 22.
1 1 7Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 29.
"18Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 22-24.
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forces of the U.S. and Canada together in one integrated
system. The Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense
Command (CINCONAD) was then dual-hatted to serve also as
CINCNORAD. In 1958, CINCNORAD's designation was switched
from a joint command to a unified command." 9
Thus, by 1960, the following unified commands were
in existence: (1) Pacific, (2) Alaskan, (3) Caribbean, (4)
Atlantic, (5) European, and (6) NORAD. In addition, SAC and
NELM maintained their status as specified commands, although
in NELM's case it was under the objection of the Army and
the Air Force, which sought to fold both its forces and its
AOR up under the European Command.' 20
3. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1958
During this period Congress, at the request of
President Eisenhower, substantially amended the National
Security Act of 1947. The resulting legislation, known as
the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958,
greatly altered the operational chain of comm=arL between the
President and his forces in the field. Th2 S2cretary of
Defense was now specifically brought into that chain, and
the JCS was pushed to the side as "the Secretary's
"'Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 24-26.
12 0Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 28.
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operational staff" ."' Commanders of both the unified and
specified commands now took their orders directly on the
authority of the President or the Secretary, and the CINCs
"were delegated full 'operational command' over forces
assigned to them"." 22 Additionally, the executive ties
between the various services and their unified and specified
commands were formally severed and replaced by direct JCS
executive sponsorship over all. In regard to internal
theater organization, "operational command would be
exercised through service component commanders or commanders
of subordinate commands, if established".1 2 3
4. The Origins of the U.S. Strike Conmand
With an increasing emphasis on conventional, rapid
reaction forces brought to the Pentagon by the accession of
the Kennedy Administration in 1961, the prevailing view of
non-assigned forces began to be transformed. With its
CONUS-based "ready" forces having been pooled together in
its so-called Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the Army
was further interested in extending this concept to form a
standing joint force ready for immediate deployment
1 2
'Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 25.
1 2 2Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 25.
1 2 3Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 26.
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throughout the world.' 24 This goal was adopted by incoming
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who in March 1961
"ordered the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and
TAC [the Air Force's Tactical Air Command] into a unified
command" . 5
This initiative was supported by both the CJCS and
the Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF), but it met with immediate
opposition from the Navy and the Marine Corps, who viewed
their forces (even the ones in their home port or base) as
being integral to the missions and operations of the Pacific
and Atlantic Fleets (and, by extension, the Navy-dominated
PACOM and LANTCOM). Both CMC and CNO preferred to settle
joint issues through a doctrinal approach or through the
formation of a standing Army-Air Force JTF headquarters
rather than through a grouping of polyglot operational
forces that would (in their eyes) surely interfere with the
rightful preserve of CINCPAC and CINCLANT. Overruling the
naval service's objections, McNamara ordered the formation
of the United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) as a unified
command, but bowing in the direction of compromise, limited
its operational control of forces to those of TAC and
CONARC. Although it was given responsibilities for the
"
24Weigley, 529.
15Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 32.
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planning and conduct of contingency operations, USSTRICOM
was not allocated a geographic area of responsibility
(AOR). 126
Shortly after its activation on 1 January 1962, a
dispute arose over the assignment of an AOR to STRICOM, with
the Army and the Air Force, along with the CJCS, arguing for
it "to be made responsible for planning and force employment
in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia
(MEAFSA). They phrased the argument as follows:
LANTCOM and NELM are required to execute operations
[in MEAFSA] with forces they do not have, using force
employment plans developed by other commands, while
USSTRICOM, with the organization and resources, is
restricted to noncombatant functions and responsibi-
lities.17
The Navy and Marine Corps, which saw this area as the
logical domain of NELM and LANT (which already had sub-
Saharan contingency responsibilities), were opposed to this
effort, but McNamara proceeded with the revision and on 30
November 1963 USSTRICOM assumed this AOR. The next day both
CINCNELM and JTF-4 (CINLANT's sub-Saharan joint task force
headquarters) were disbanded, with the residual naval
126History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 32-33.
127History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 34 as
quoted from (S) JCSM-496-63 to SecDef, 12 Jul 63 (derived
from JCS 1259/634-5).
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headquarters in London reverting to the role of component
commander for EUCOM. 1 28
5. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Unified
Coummand Plan
Although major blows never came to pass over the
Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the operational
planning and force deployments necessitated by the crisis
went a long way toward simulating the wartime situation that
the UCP was supposed to have been designed to support. The
Atlantic Command, as the unified command within whose AOR
Cuba fell, was to serve as the overall commander of a
projected invasion of the island. Contingency planning over
the previous year and a half had focused on this course of
action, and in support of this planning two service
commands, the Army's Continental Army Command (CONARC) and
the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), were instructed
to designate major force commanders to support CINCLANT (who
had no active Army or Air Force component Commanders at the
time) in this endeavor. What resulted was the assignment
of CG, XVIII Airborne Corps and Commander, 19th Air Force as
interim component commanders for planning purposes.129
128Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 33-35.
129History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 30.
The authors report that in July 1961 "the CNO and the CMC
recommended to their colleagues [on the JCS] that CINCARLANT
and CINCAFLANT be activated. The CSA and CSAF replied that
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As the JCS history then describes, with the missile
crisis unfolding, on 20 October 1962
CINCLANT designated COMTAC and CG, CONARC as interim
Air Force and Army component commanders for contingency
planning. (In September, on his own initiative, COMTAC
had assumed the duties of CINCAFLANT). Also, CINCLANT
changed the invasion plan by naming CG, CONARC, rather
than CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, as Commander, Joint Task
Force--Cuba.
Forces designated to take part in the invasion were
transferred as expected from CINCSTRIKE to the operational
control of CINCLANT. However, on the 21st,
CINCLANT promulgated a new command structure. CG,
XVIII Airborne Corps was redesignated CJTF--Cuba; he
would report directly to CINCLANT. Thus CG, CONARC was
effectively excluded from the operational chain of
command. 3 0
The passages related above seem to suggest that CONARC
rightly should have been in the operational chain of command
for the projected invasion, but an alternate analysis
suggests that the planning and operational responsibility
for the invasion should never have been removed from the
commanders of the 19th Air Force or the XVIII Airborne Corps
in the first place. After all, they had 'worked the
problem' for almost a year and a half by October 1962, and,
even with the increased allocation of forces, they were much
better positioned to execute operational responsibilities
Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Continental Army Command
(CONARC) were already giving CINCLANT sufficient support.
130History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 31.
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than were their respective higher service headquarters. In
time, (December 1966) both COMTAC and CG, CONARC were
designated as component service commanders for CINCLANT, but
not until after a similar scenario was played out in the
Dominican Republic in 1965.111
In the summer of 1963, the Secretary of Defense,
after almost a year of discussion with the JCS, approved the
change in the title of the Caribbean Command to the U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), in order that it might better
reflect its Central American focus. The command's AOR still
officially excluded South America, but the Kennedy
Administration's strong interest in this area pointed to
its future southward expansion."3
D. THE VIETNAM WAR PERIOD
The Kennedy Administration also brought to the executive
branch a renewed interest in Southeast Asia and an activist
approach to counter-insurgency operations. Just a few years
after the Eisenhower Administration's refusal to further aid
the French cause in Vietnam, emphasis was once again placed
on stanching the tide of communism in Thailand, Laos, and
South Vietnam through the application of an increasing range
1 3
'Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 31-32.
1 3 2History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 36.
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of military assistance programs under the control and
sponsorship of the Pacific Command.
1. The Establishment and Organization of N&CV
The rising commitment of U.S. resources and prestige
to the government of South Vietnam led to the establishment
of Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV)
in February of 1962. Although designated from its start as
a subordinate command of CINCPAC, there was some discussion
at that time of the relative merits of its establishment as
a separate unified command, but this was opposed by the JCS
and CINCPAC
on the grounds that communist pressures throughout
Southeast Asia dictated a unified military effort for
the area as a whole. They proposed that this could best
be accomplished by a subordinate unified command under
CINCPAC. 1 33
With %his decision instituted, the matter rested
until 1964 and 1965, when separate air and naval components
were established. Command of the Army component, however,
remained as an additional responsibility of COMUSMACV, being
that he was a senior Army general.1 "4 As the war grew in
scope and intensity, a dichotomy developed whereby COMUSMACV
exercised operational control over U.S. forces within South
Vietnam and its coastal waters (with the exception of 7th
1 3 3Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-19'77, 37.
134Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 37-38.
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Fleet air and naval gunfire missions in the south) but the
conduct of the "strategic" air and naval campaigns against
the north were controlled by CINCPAC through his Air Force
(PACAF) and Navy (PACFLT) components, with the addition as
well of SAC when B-52 missions were instituted."3 '
Within South Vietnam itself, a command structure
evolved that reflected the historical Army CinC preference
(as in the case of Eisenhower) of serving as the overall
combined ground forces commander as well as the theater (or
sub-unified theater, as in this case) commander. Thus, by
mid-1966, Gen. William Westmoreland, in addition to having
an air component (7th Air Force) and a naval component
(U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, which was responsible for
inshore and inland operations), directly commanded the four
principal geographic area commands in South Vietnam (Corps
Tactical Zones, or CTZs).16
2. The Control of Air Dispute: Round Two
Further complicating the internal command
arrangements of MACV was the inclusion of a Marine air-
ground formation of corps size - the IIT Marine Amphibious
1 3 5Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 38-39.
136see George S. Eckardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and
Control 1950-1969, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the
Army, 1974) 64-67. The I Corps Tactical Zone was under the
command of CG, III MAF, who was also the Marine component
commander.
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Force (III MAF) - which possessed an organic aircraft wing
consisting of both helicopters and jet aircraft, the latter
intended primarily for Close Air Support of the Marine
divisions in the area. Thus, the pattern that first
developed during the Korean War once again emerged whereby
the Air Force (in the guise of the 7th Air Force, rather
than the 5th, as had been the nemesis in Korea) sought to
exert operational control over all fixed-wing sorties in the
name of concentration of effort, while the Marines protested
that their air units were specifically funded (by Congress),
built, and trained to provide effective CAS to their
otherwise light (in organic heavy artillery) ground
forces. 37
An additional aspect of the Air Force - Marine
struggle may have revolved around the CINCPAC-imposed
limitations on MACV's ability to wage war against the foe
immediately across the border. One suspects that
Westmoreland and his subordinate air commander, frustrated
at CINCPAC over their lack of direct control over the air
war against the north, may have turned their wrath on the





Once again a compromise solution was worked out that
was expedient for the situation at hand but failed to
adequately address the question for the future. After
following the Korean War pattern of, at first, nearly
complete independence of Marine air, there next came a
period of nearly complete control by the 7th Air Force.
However, by 1970
a revision of MACV's guidance on air operations
reaffirmed the air-ground integrity of III MAF and gave
the CG Seventh Air Force only the broadest coordinating
authority, a change that preserved single management in
name but brought actual air operations back to pre-1968
practices.
Thus, in the Marine view
[t]he Air Force kept its pale doctrinal victory, but
III MAF received the best close air support ever provided
Marines ... 19
Although time would tell which - if either - of the services
had "won" or "lost" this issue, once again a provisional
battlefield solution was achieved but the larger doctrinal
issue was shelved for another day.
3. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense
Even as the war in Vietnam raged at its peak of
intensity, the topic of defense reorganization was again
addressed, although this time by an independent Blue Ribbon
139Millett, 588.
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Defense Panel appointed by President Nixon in 1969.14° As
part of its charter, the panel was asked to report and make
recommendations on DoD's "command and control function and
facilities", and as such they noted that
[tihe present combatant command structure does not
facilitate the solution of many serious problems which
materially affect the security of the nation. For
example, recent advances in technology require much
closer coordination for and employing the forces of the
Continental Air Defense Command and the Strategic Air
Command than can be reasonably expected with two separate
commands.
As for the existing Unified Commands, they
do not bring about unification of the Armed Forces,
but rather are layered with Service component headquarters
and large headquarters' staffs.14 1
In regard to the Unified Command Plan, the solutions
advocated by the panel included the establishment of three
new Unified Commands:
(1) A Strategic Command, composed of the existing
Strategic Air Command, the Joint Strategic Target Plan-
ning Staff, the Continental Air Defense Command, and Fleet
Ballistic Missile Operations;
(2) A Tactical (or General Purpose) Command, composed of
all combatant general purpose forces of the United States
assigned to organized combatant units; and
(3) A Logistics Command, to exercise for all combatant
forces supervision of support activities...
140see Report to the President and the Secretary of
Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon
Panel. 1 July 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970) hereafter referred to as 1970 Blue
Ribbon Panel.
1'11970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 1.
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in an additional comment, the panel flatly stated that
[n]o Commander of a Unified Command should be
permitted to serve concurrently as Chief of his Military
Service. 142
The panel also recommended that
Unified Commanders should be given unfragmented
command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders
of component commands should be redesignated Deputies to
the commander of the appropriate Unified Command..."'3
The last comment seemed to be directed at the unsatisfactory
internal command arrangements within MACV, since the report
noted that
[t]he capability and effectiveness of combatant
forces would be improved by organizing them into a
structure with commands that are mission-oriented and
with operational command lines that are direct, clear, and
unambiguous.14
In particular, it stated that the command structure should
"assure that all combatant forces are truly unified as to
perform the command mission", which was likely a criticism
directed at what some considered unwieldy aviation command
arrangements between the Air Force and the Marines in
Vietnam. 145
Perhaps the most radical solution proposed by the
panel was the consolidation of then-existing Unified
1`21970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 4.
..12_170 Blue Ribbon Panel, 5.
... 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 51.
145 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 51.
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(theater) Commands into functional groupings by:
(1) Merging the Atlantic Command and the Strike
Command;
(2) Abolishing the Southern Command and reassigning its
functions to the merged Atlantic and Strike Commands;
(3) Abolishing the Alaskan Command and reassigning its
general purpose function to the Pacific Command and its
strategic functions to the Strategic Command; and
(4) Restructuring the command channels of the sub-unified
-ommands. 146
In a s'mewhat unusual proposal, the remaining three area
commands (European, Pacific, and the merged Atlantic/Strike
/Southern) would be subordinated to an overall Commander,
Tactical (or General Purpose) Command.1 47 Although no action
was initially taken along the lines of the Blue Ribbon
Panel's recommendations in regard to the UCP, the genesis of
future reorganizations can be clearly seen in many of its
arguments.
4. The 1970 Packard Review
An internal DoD study on the question of the need
for USSOUTHCOM which was commissioned by Deputy Secretary
Packard reported back in early 1970 with the view that it
was not necessary. Despite the opposition of the JCS, the
Deputy Secretary decided to act on the report's
1461970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 5.
1`71970 Blue Ribbon Panel, 4.
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recommendation, but he delayed its presentation to the
President pending the results of a JCS review of the UCP.
Predictably, the JCS could not present a united front to
Packard on the subject, diverging significantly on the
structure of a post-SOUTHCOM plan. Service' views on what
the remaining commands would look like were as follows:
Army - Air Force Navy
EUCOM (with Middle East) EUCOM (with Middle East)
STRICOM (with Latin America) LANTCOM (with sub-Africa)
PACOM (to remain) PACOM (with South Asia)
LANTCOM (to specified CinC)
The CMC "supported the CNO position except to propose that
USSTRICOM be redesignated the U.S. Readiness Command
(USREDCOM) with unchanged responsibilities".
The compromise position worked out between Deputy
Secretary Packard and the JCS in March 1971 for the
President's consideration contained five major provisions:
(1) extension of USEUCOM to include 'Mediterranean
littoral, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Iran';
(2) adjustment of the PACOM area to join with USEUCOM
east of Iran and with LANTCOM west of South America
and east of Africa in such a way that LANTCOM would
have responsibility for the waters surrounding South
America and Africa;
(3) retention of ALCOM as a unified command but with
area responsibility altered to assign PACOM the
Aleutian Islands;
148History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 42-43.
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(4) disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and USSTRICOM/
USCINCMEAFSA, with area responsibility for area
responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara and
Latin America unassigned, except for the Canal Zone,
which was assigned to LANTCOM..., and;
(5) establishment of a new unified command, U.S.
Readiness Command (USREDCOM) without area responsibi-
lity and consisting of CONUS-based forces to reinforce
other unified commands. 14 9
All of the above were directed to be carried out by
President Nixon with the exception of the Southern Command;
its fate was to be determined in the future after further
study. In effect, the issue was soon dropped from active
consideration, but was raised again in a 1974 review of the
UCP.
5. The 1974 Schlesinger Review
In the 1974 review, the JCS recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that Southern Command, Alaskan Command,
and the Continental Air Defense Command be disestablished
(the latter because it was believed that the USAF Aerospace
Defense Command could effectively cover the same mission),
although SOUTHCOM residual missions were again caught in a
disagreement with the CSA and the CSAF on one side and the
CNO and CMC on the other.'1 0 At the same time, the JCS were
149History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 43-44.
5'°History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 48.
Predictably, the Army and Air Force wanted the Canal Zone
defense to be REDCOM's responsibility, while the Navy and
the Marines argued for the mission to go to LANTCOM.
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split over the future of LANTCOM and PACOM, with the Navy
and Marines favoring the status quo and the Army and Air
Force favoring their redesignation as specified commands.
The Army and Air Force argued as well for the re-
establishment of a command in Northeast Asia, to be
responsible for Japan, Korea, and Okinawa, and a similar one
in the Southwest Pacific. The future of REDCOM also was
raised, with the naval services and the CJCS now favoring
its elimination.1 5 1
To summarize, the various positions on the future
UCP in 1974 were as follows:
Army-Air Force CJCS Navy-Marine Corps
Unified: Unified: Unified:
Europe Europe Europe
Northeast Asia Atlantic Atlantic









5'5History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 48-49.
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Judging from the voting pattern, it should come as no great
surprise that the CJCS during this period was an admiral.'"2
What Secretary of Defense Schlesinger thought of the
extreme polarization of views forwarded to him on the
subject one can but speculate, however he forwarded a
recommendation to the President in late 1974 conforming
largely to the views of the Chairman and the naval services.
He proposed that EUCOM, PACOM, LANTCOM, REDCOM, and SAC
remain essentially as they were. In a nod toward the Army
and Air Force position, Schlesinger directed that
"[c]ontingency plans were to be prepared for activation of a
Northeast Asia Command, a Southwest Pacific Command, and
other regional commands and task forces as necessary",
although in the end none of these were established during
his tenure. Once again the Southern Command was to be
disestablished by JCS consensus, only for this action to be
postponed "pending the resolution of the Panama Canal
negotiations".'"3 Schlesinger's proposals for the
reorganization of the UCP (less SOUTHCOM, of course) were
'
52CJCS was Admiral Thomas H. Moorer from 2 July 1970 to
1 July 1974. See William J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989) 81.
'
5 3History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 50-51.
88
approved by the President on 21 April 1975 and went into
effect on 1 July of that year.' 5
Two other changes of significance to the UCP were
instituted during this period. The first dealt with the
designation of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) as a
specified command. Although the CSAF (with the support of
the other service chiefs) sought to block this move on the
grounds that MAC would better support the unified commands
from its current position of subordination tc the Secretary
of the Air Force, he was overruled by the Deputy Secretary
at the behest of the CJCS. Thus, on 1 February 1977 CINCMAC
became
the commander of a specified command comprising all
forces assigned for the accomplishment of his military
airlift missions during wartime, periods of crisis,
JCS exercises, and as necessary to insure the operational
support to other unified and specified commands.' 5
The second major change to the UCP was the
initiation in early 1976 of a theater boundary redrawing
between LANTCOM and PACOM off of East Africa. Prior to the
redraw, the entire ocean area surrounding sub-Saharan Africa
had been the responsibility of LANTCOM, but a JCS discussion
concerning the advisability of altering EUCOM's Middle East
mandate (initiated by the CSA, who wanted that AOR for
154Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 51-52.
1 5 5Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 56.
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REDCOM) ended up resulting in the shift of the entire Indian
Ocean and the waters off the east coast of Africa to PACOM
in order to "simplify command arrangements".156
6. The Origins of the U.S. Central Command
By the late 1970s, American strategic planners came
to focus increasing attention on the Middle Eastern area
and, in particular, the vital oil-producing states bordering
the Arabian Gulf. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan served to buttress the argument for
establishing a separate unified command to deal exclusively
with this volatile area, but once again the JCS were
initially unable to come up with a satisfactory realignment
of AORs to make room for a new command.
Predictably, the services split along traditional
lines, with the Army and Air Force desiring the Middle East
AOR (or Southwest Asia, as it was increasingly referred to)
to be converted to a sub-unified command under EUCOM, while
the Navy and Marine Corps pushed for its establishment as a
sub-unified command under PACOM.'15 As an interim solution,
a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed -
originally under REDCOM - to plan for and execute any major
contingency operation in the area of Southwest Asia.
1 56Historv of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977, 54-55.
5'5 Defense Orqanization: The Need for Change, 321.
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Rejecting the various services' positions, the Secretary of
Defense in 1983 stood up a separate unified command, the
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), with an AOR of Southwest
Asia and the Horn of Africa.'ý8
"'SDefense Organization: The Need for Change, 293.
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IV. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT AND UNITY OF COMMAND
A. THE PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM
The at times bitter disengagement of the U.S. from the
Vietnam War, with its final act consisting of the costly
retaking of the Mayaguez as part of the 1975 evacuation of
Phnom Penn and Saigon, provoked a flurry of analyses which
attempted to explain the causes of the American military
failure in this region. The apologies and explanations for
this defeat of American arms ranged from the cultural and
sociological limitations of the individual U.S. combat
soldier up through the failure of U.S. Presidents and
strategists to view the world without ideological blinders.
The continuation of this string of military failures
along with the occasional sloppy "victory" throughout the
late 1970s and early 1980s served to focus the critical
attention in part on the supposedly awkward and divided
theater command arrangements that had been fashioned over
time out of undue concern for parochial service interests.
Three events in particular gave rise to this school of
analysis: the 1980 failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran
(Desert One), the 1983 bombing of the Marine battalion
headquarters building in Lebanon, and the successful but
problem-filled invasion of Grenada, also in 1983. Problems
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in each operation seemed to result from a failure in some
aspect of joint command, primarily due either to the
apportioning of missions as if they were equal slices of a
pie, an unwieldy chain of command, or a refusal on the part
of various service components to cooperate laterally within
that chain.
1. The 1980 Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt
The failed rescue attempt of American hostages in
Iran (Desert One) in April 1980 pointed to some serious
deficiencies in the training, organization, and
interoperability of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOFs).
In particular, critics detected in the ad hoc composition of
the strike forces utilized for the operation an attempt to
give every service a "slice of the pie". As a consequence,
unity of command and the assignment of appropriately-skilled
personnel to the mission - and thus its chances for success
- were perceived to have been sacrificed in order to satisfy
parochial service considerations.1 5 9
The lessons drawn from the experience of this
debacle, in addition to a growing realization that the
services could not be trusted to adequately fund and support
SOFs, included the need for a greater, focused emphasis on
joint operations and a clearer delineation of both the
159Defense organization: The Need for Change, 361-62.
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authority and the responsibility for military operations
from the President down to the tactical units in the field.
However, it was to take several more years and two more
problem-filled and tragic military operations before the
resurgence of interest in the area of unity of command
extended to a reform-minded Congress.
2. The Beizrut Bombing
The truck-bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing
Team (BLT) headquarters building in Beirut, Lebanon on 23
October 1983, in addition to being the costliest single
attack on U.S. military forces in over a decade, represented
a tremendous defeat for American diplomacy in the Middle
East. The post-mortems of this event once again revealed a
failure to conduct a unified effort in Lebanon both between
the Departments of State and Defense and within the Defense
Department itself.
Relating to the lack of a unified military effort,
the mission of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) that was the
U.S. component of the Multi-National Force (MNF) was kept
separate from the activities of the U.S. military advisory
group, whose mission was to train the Christian-dominated
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in an attempt to strengthen the
authority of the Lebanese Government. That the former was
supposed to be engaged in neutral peacekeeping while the
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latter was engaged - at least in the view of the Muslim and
Druze factions - in actively aiding and abetting the
Lebanese Christian attempt to re-impose order and control
was not viewed as an inherently contradictory and even
ludicrous set of missions - at least until the late summer
of 1983. By then this arguably faint distinction was made
irrelevant by the heavy use of American naval gunfire in
support of the LAF's battles for the Shouf Mountains south
of Beirut in mid-September 1983, an event that helped set
the stage for the tragedy of 23 October. 1 60
Criticism was also focused on the overly-
bureaucratic chain of command in effect at the time of the
bombing:
... the many layers of military headquarters separa-
ting the Secretary of Defense (and the JCS, as his
executive agent) from the one small MAU in Beirut also
aggravated the coordination problem. All orders had to
be transmitted through this very elongated chain-of-
command, and it is unquestionably the case that both
nuance and conceptual clarity were lost in the process.
Finally, Washington actors refused either to delegate
authority (e.g. authority to employ naval gunfire) to the
MAU Commander or to take responsibility for direct
operational control of the USMNF.1 6 1
160For more information concerning the eývents that led
up to the bombing of the BLT headquarters, see Benis M.
Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984, (Washington, D.C.:
History and Museums Division, Headquarters, United States
Marine Corps, 1987) 70-105.
"
61Ralph A. Hallenbeck, Military Force as an Instrument
of U.S. Foreian Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August
1982-February 1984 (New York: Praeger, 1991) 150.
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The inability, unwillingness, or simple lack of
consideration on the part 3f the Secretary of Defense or the
JCS to shorten the chain of command made it extremely
difficult for the Marines on the ground to adapt to the
rapidly chaiging conditions. This is in stark contrast to
the activities of U.S. Special Envoy (and soon to be the
U.S. National Security Advisor) Robert McFarlane, who was
able to communicate freely with his superiors in the White
House on a regular basis.162
3. The Invasion of Grenada
The invasion of Grenada, which was undertaken and
completed within a few days of the Beirut bombing,
nevertheless also became the target of extensive criticism
both from within Congress and without. Although the
operation was a success, various problems encountered during
its course seemed to suggest that once again the services
were either unwilling or unable to subordinate selfish
interests for the sake of an effective joint effort.
Specific concerns included the division of the
island into Army and Marine AORs, the inability of the
various forces to communicate effectively across service
lines, and the failure on the part of the JTF commander to




friendly-fire casualties were blamed in part on the problems
named above, as well as the deaths of a number of Grenadan
civilian non-combatants.
As was the case with the Iranian hostage rescue
attempt, the forces assigned to carry out the operation
seemed to have been apportioned out to the services based as
much on political considerations as on operational ones.
The Marine Corps argued that the operation could have been
handled more effectively as an exclusively naval operation,
while the Army found fault with the JTF Commander's decision
not to appoint an overall ground forces commander on the
island.!6 3 To many in Congress, this dispute simply
reinforced their notion that none of the services were
really serious about joint military operations. In
combination with the Beirut and Iranian fiascos, this
experience fueled the fire of reformers who sought to
strengthen the ability of unified commanders to overcome
service resistance to joint warfare.
B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
1. The SASC Review of Defense Organization
In January 1985, a special study was initiated at
the direction of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman
.
63Defense Organization: The Need for Chance, 363-370.
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Barry Goldwater (R-Az) and its ranking minority member Sam
Nunn (D-Ga) to study the "organization and decision-making
procedures of the Department of Defense".' 6 4 This landmark
study, released on 16 October 1985 under the title Defense
Organization: The Need for Change, served as the framework
within which the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was crafted,
debated, and eventually incorporated into law.
In the report's review of the Unified and Specified
Commands, the six main problem areas identified were:
(1) a confused chain of command from the Commander
in Chief to the operational commanders;
(2) The weak authority of Unified Commanders over Service
component commands;
(3) the imbalance between the responsibilities and
accountability of the Unified Commanders and their
influence over resource decisions;
(4) the absence of unification below the level of the
Unified Commander and his staff;
(5) the absence of an objective review of the Unified
Command Plan; and
(6) Unnecessary micro-management of tactical operations
and circumvention of the chain of command during crises.' 65
In regard to the absence of unification below the
theater level, the study quoted President Eisenhower's
rationale for the 1958 reorganization:
16'Defense Organization: The Need for Change, III.
16 5Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 302-322.
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If ever again we should be involved in a war, we
will fight it in all elements, with all services, as
one single concentrated effort.
In particular, it emphasized Eisenhower's view that
[pleacetime preparatory and organizational activity
must conform to this fact.' 66
With that in mind, the report went on to cite examples, both
before and after unity of command was agreed upon in
principle during World War II, in support of its argument
for greater unificatir, within a theater of military
operations. It noted that
[w]hile unified commands may be organized to conduct
theater campaigns similar to those of World War II, it
is evident that they are not organized to respond to
lesser threats like the Pueblo seizure or the Mayaguez
incident. 167
Also, the case of the Vietnam War was raised, where "a
complex and fragmented structure was created to control U.S.
forces in and around Vietnam". The report's authors
pronounced that "service considerations played the major
role in the formulation of this ineffective command
arrangement" 168
The analysis of the lack of an objective review
process for the UCP was revealing:
"
166Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 312.
16'Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 314.
16'Defense organization: The Need for Change, 316.
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The current operational command arrangement is essen-
tially an evolutionary one, building on the base that
existed at the end of World War II. As U.S. worldwide
national security interests have waxed and waned, old
commands have been eliminated and new commands created.
It went on to note that
[i]f one were to ignore the current Unified Command
Plan and start from scratch to design a new plan, it might
well differ significantly from the one that exists today.
Clearly, today's worldwide strategic environment is
drastically different from the one that existed at the
end of World War II (emphasis mine).169
Considering that this report was written in 1985, the above
statement is particularly appropriate for the strategic
situation of mid- and late 1990s, given the sweeping changes
on the international scene in the last decade.
Close on the heels of Defense Organization,
President Reagan assembled a Blue Ribbon Commission under
former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard to also study
and look for ways to improve defense management. Included
among its findings, which were published in June 1986, were
recommendations that:
(1) subject to the review and approval of the Secre-
tary of Defense, Unified Commanders should be given
broader authority to structure subordinate commands,
joint task forces, and support activities in such a way
that best supports their missions and results in a
significant reduction in the size and numbers of military
headquarters;
(2) The Unified Command Plan should be revised to assure
increased flexibility to deal with situations that overlap
169Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 320.
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the geographic boundaries of the current combatant
commands and with changing world conditions.
(3) For contingencies short of general war, the Secretary
of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman and the JCS,
should have the flexibility to establish the shortest
possible chains of command for each force deployed,
consistent with proper supervision and support. This
would help the CINCs and the JCS perform better in
situations ranging from peace to crisis to general war."'0
Additionally, the report advocated the establishment of a
"single unified command to integrate global air, land, and
sea transportation...". This last measure was instituted
on 1 October 1987 with the stand-up of the U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott Air Force Base in
Illinois.171
2. The Impact of Goldwater-Nichols
As to the effect of Defense Organization: The Need
for Change on the structure of the UCP, it amounted to
relatively little, which is not surprising given its
comparatively modest recommendations in this particular
area. It undoubtedly helped further the cause of
"jointness" by the incorporation (in the Goldwater-Nichols
170A Ouest for Excellence: Final Report to the President
by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management David Packard, Chairman, June 1986, Washington,
D.C., 38.
1
71see Glenn W. Goodman, Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer,
"An exclusive AFJ interview with: General Duane H. Cassidy,
USAF," Armed Forces Journal International January 1988, 49-
54.
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Act) of many of its recommendations designed to shift
greater command authority to the CINCs and away from the
Services, but no wholesale review and reorganization of the
Unified Commands with geographic AORs along the lines
suggested (but not recommended) by the report was
instituted."'
The biggest change to the UCP structure resulting
from the 1986 legislation was the creation of several
unified "type" or "forces" commands out of various
service or Specified Commands. In addition to TRANSCOM,
two other unified commands were brought into being within
several years of the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. One
result of the heightened Congressional interest in the wake
of the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran was an effort
on its part to find a way to better integrate the various
special operations forces in the U.S. military. An
additional concern was the relatively low priority given
special operations forces by their respective service
headquarters, in particular during times of declining
defense budgets.
The solution adopted to address both of these problems
was to institute a joint command structure which
172see Defense Oraanization: The Need for Change, 351-
353, for the recommendations concerning the organization of
Unified and Specified Commands and the proper roles of the
Defense Secretary and the JCS Chairman.
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incorporated and separately funded all of the U.S. special
operations forces. It was anticipated that, in addition to
greatly improved coordination and interoperability, the
creation of such a command under a four-star general would
also give these forces the kind of high visibility and
strong advocate necessary for their bureaucratic survival."7 '
The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was
established at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida in 1987, taking
over the headquarters and facilities of the disestablished
U.S. Readiness Command.' 7 4
A similar event had occurred in 1984, when the
Reagan Administration decided to consolidate the various
services' space operations headquarters and facilities under
a unified command. While none of the services had starved
their space operations activities, the Administration felt
that a closer integration and rationalization of the various
service space programs was nonetheless necessary. The end
result was the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), which was
established on 23 September 1985."'1
"'
3for a detailed discussion of the background to this
consolidation, see Michael Ganley, "Congress Creates New
Unified Command for SOF and New Civilian SOF Chief," Armed
Forces Journal International November 1986, 20-22.
174"New Special Ops Command Established," Armed Forces
Journal International May 1987, 12.
"'
7 Defense Organization: The Need for Chan g, 275.
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C. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: AN ASSESSMNNT
1. Cuah=ma: A Job Half Finished
Even with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols,
criticisms of the Unified Command Plan continued to be
brought forward from various groups outside the Pentagon.
Lt. General John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.) in 1990 authored a
penetrating analysis of the post-Goldwater-Nichols flaws of
the UCP.1 7 6  While lauding the framers' efforts to "ensure
that the authority of the unified and specified combat
commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of
those commanders...", General Cushman maintained that
[mlerely having authority to match responsibility
is not sufficient, however. Capacity, the means to
accomplish missions assigned, is also needed. Without
adequate resources or command and control a commander in
chief, no matter how extensive the "authority", will not
be able to accomplish the mission effectively. 177 [emphasis
mine]
In particular, Cushman detected a huge disconnect between,
on the one hand, the authority and responsibility of the
unified area CINCs (European, Southern, Atlantic, Pacific,
and Central) and, on the other, their capacity to execute
176see LtGen. John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.) "The Planning,
Command, and Conduct of Military Operations: An Assessment
of DoD Performance, 1986-1988," in Making Defense Reform
Work(James A. Blackwell Jr. and Barry M. Blechman, Editors)
(Washington: Brassey's (US), 1990) pps. 105-119. Hereafter
referred to as Cushman, Planning.
17 7Cushman, Planning, 107.
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their assigned missions with dispatch. He foresaw in the
failure of the Secretary of Defense to execute a Goldwater-
Nichols' directive to perform a comprehensive review of the
area unified commands' the actual consequence that "some
CINC's authority and capacity for mission preparedness
grossly undermatch their responsibility and
accountability"."'8
Cushman used several examples to illustrate his
point. In the first, he examined the case of CENTCOM in the
late 1980s, where he saw that adequate forces were under the
direct command of the CINC to perform the tanker escort and
general presence missions required of him at the time.
However, in considering the worst-case scenario, which was
at the time a massive Soviet offensive aimed at the seizure
of the region's oil fields, the CINC was utterly dependent
on forces that would be seconded to him by other CINCs such
as CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CINCFOR. This patched-together
force would, in his opinion, have "no time for on the job
training" but nevertheless "must perform superbly from its
first introduction into combat". Thus, "if it is to
succeed, it must be well organized, led, trained, and





system does not allow for the development of the kind of
teamwork between the CINC and his warfighting subordinates
that is critical to success in combat.
General Cushman's prescription was that, in order
[tlo ensure a success-oriented, rather than failure-
prone state of readiness, they [the CINCs] need, at a
minimum, some day-to-day "authority, direction, and
control" of a sizeable all-service joint task force,
which they could then train and otherwise prepare for
employment in the variety of possible conditions under
which they might be required to fight."8 '
Cushman's other examples called attention to the fact that
some forces that are operating within a geographic CINC's
AOR are many times kept out of his chain of command. He
first cited the example of the U.S.S. Okinawa, an amphibious
assault ship that, even with tensions running high in Panama
in April 1988, was left under the command of CINCLANT during
its transit through the Canal Zone. He viewed such a
situation as an accident waiting to happen, arguing that one
could reasonably foresee a circumstance whereby CINCSOUTH
could have needed to quickly call upon the Okinawa and its
embarked Marines to support a developing contingency
operation within his AOR. Similarly divided command
180Cushman, Planning, 112.
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arrangements might surely have hampered the successful
execution of such an operation.' 8'
Along this vein, Gen. Cushman examined the problem
of Marine forces operating ashore or in close proximity to
South Korea during major exercises, yet remaining under the
command of the Commander, 7th Fleet, which is normally
headquartered in Japan. He posited that, like the situation
in Panama, such divided command arrangements in a
particularly tense region of the world invite trouble should
the situation turn sour. In the above-mentioned cases of
both Panama and Korea, General Cushman argued persuasively
that these divided command arrangements, while they may have
been within the letter of Goldwater-Nichols, were certainly
not within the spirit or the intent of the law's framers.' 82
As is the case with many UCP issues, some of Gen.
Cushman's complaints centered on joint command arrangements
that had their roots in a Cold War warfighting strategy that
dictated a 'Europe first' prioritization of effort. Thus,
neither CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, or even UNC Korea rated
significant dedicated forces when the decisive theater of
"
81Cushman, Planning, 117. This situation may have been
personally galling to Gen. Cushman, who served as the
Combined Forces Commander in South Korea, and thus had to




war was expected to be in Europe and the North Atlantic. As
such, the forces that these CINCs received for in-theater
training and exercises were not necessarily the ones that
they would see if a major contingency were to arise.
Nonetheless, other contingencies in the late 1980s - such as
the "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf - did involve instances
where major combat forces in the immediate area remained
under the control of supporting CINCs rather than being
"chopped" to the supported CINC.
2. Panama: The First Test
The December 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama, which
was one of the largest American military operations since
the end of the Vietnam War and "the largest military night
operation since World War II", provided a glimpse of how the
Goldwater-Nichols Act was to be translated into joint
operations in the future.183 Primarily an Army and Special
Operations show, JUST CAUSE was nevertheless unique in
several important ways.
Perhaps taking heed of the earlier criticism
regarding the U.S.S. Okinawa's transit of the Panama Canal,
U.S. naval units operating in proximity to the AOR were
chopped to SOUTHCOM in order to provide relatively minor
183Robert R. Ropelewski, "Planning, Precision, and
Surprise Led to Panama Successes," Armed Forces Journal
International February 1990, 26-32.
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support for the operation. A reinforced company task force
of Marine light armor and infantry participated as well,
although its missions were kept separate for the most part
from the major brigade-sized Army operations throughout the
country. All in all, the operation did not measurably
contribute to an expanded interpretation of 'jointness',
although on the down side there was significant criticism
within the Army concerning the decision to involve so many
CONUS-based units (including the JTF Headquarters) rather
than relying on the Panama-based units and their
headquarters to conduct the operation."'
3. The War in the Persian Gulf: 1990-1991
When the U.S. deployed forces to the Middle East in
1990 in response to the 2 August Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
it did so under the overall command of General Norman
Schwarzkopf, who was then serving as the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT). As described earlier
in this section, prior to August 1990 there were relatively
small forces operating under Schwarzkopf's immediate
command. They consisted primarily of the Joint Task Force
Middle East (JTFME), which was at the time composed of a
squadron of small surface combatants and support ships
184Tacticus, "Few Lessons Were Learned in Panama
Invasion," Armed Forces Journal International June 1993, 54.
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augmented on occasion by larger naval units, as well as
specialized Army and Air Force detachments. This Task Force
Commander also served as the on-scene representative for
Naval Component Commander for CENTCOM, while its Army and
Air Force Components were based in CONUS and dual-hatted as
the commanders or deputy commanders of other service
formations.185
The major formations that were rushed to the Gulf in
August and September of 1990 included the 7th Fleet (with
several aircraft carrier battle groups as well as an afloat
Marine Expeditionary Brigade), the XVIII Airborne Corps
(with an airborne, an air assault, and two mechanized
divisions), the 9th Air Force (with multiple fighter,
bomber, and tanker wings), and the I Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) (with a division, an aircraft wing, and a
force service support group). 9
As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Gen.
Schwarzkopf had (arguably) a great deal more latitude to
185CENTCOM's Army component (ARCENT) was headed by LtGen
John Yeosock, who commanded the Third Army and also held the
billet of Deputy Commander, FORSCOM. The Air Force
Component (CENTAF) was headed by LtGen. Charles Horner, who
as CG, Ninth Air Force was in peacetime a subordinate of the
Tactical Air Command. See John H. Cushman, "Desert Storm's
End Game," Naval Institute Proceedings October 1993, 76-80.
116Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991) 75.
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internally organize his combat forces as he saw fit than did
his predecessors.' 8 7 In the early months of Desert Shield,
where the focus was primarily on the rapid build-up of the
minimum essential force for an adequate defense of Saudi
Arabia, internal command arrangements were (apparently) not
an issue. The Marines, spreading out to the north from
their initial base at the port of Jubayl as the arrival of
successive pre-positioned Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEBs) permitted, formed an enclave reminiscent in some
ways of that around Da Nang, South Vietnam almost 30 years
before. The Army, on the other hand, built up from its base
in and around the Dahran airfield complex to the south
through which the lead elements of XVIII Airborne Corps had
arrived in Saudi Arabia. Thus, in many ways the constraints
imposed by 'expeditionary' logistics tended to support
separate Army and Marine commands in the early phase of the
deployment.
President Bush's 8 November 1990 announcement of the
further massive deployment of forces - including a four-
division "heavy" corps, as well as a second Marine division
and a second afloat MEB - to the theater created an entirely
new operational situation on the ground. With the projected
movement of all of these new forces northward toward the
187see Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 76-77.
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Kuwaiti border, Schwarzkopf was left with an array of
options concerning the mixing and matching of Army and
Marine ground formations.
In a stinging article in the October 1993 Naval
Institute Proceedings, Gen. John Cushman analyzed
Schwarzkopf's decisions regarding CENTCOM's land forces
organization during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in light
of the argument that the operation was less than a complete
success because of its failure to destroy the Iraqi
Republican Guard.' 8 8 He discerned that the failure to
do so may have been in large part due to the CinC's lack of
a good sense of what was happening on the battlefield.
Specifically, he cited German operational doctrine, which
uses the term fingerspitzengefuehl (fingertip touch)
to capture a commander's masterful hands-on sensing of the
moving tactical situation on the battlefield, together
with the situation's risks and opportunities.' 8 9
According to General Cushman,
For the ground war of Desert Storm, General Schwarz-
kopf did not have fingertip touch; he had not created a
command and control scheme that would allow it. Lacking
this essential fingertip touch in the war's final hours,
he evidently did not grasp - and he surely failed to
seize, the opportunity to trap all of Iraq's forces
south of the Euphrates.190
'
88Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 76-80.
18 9Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 76.
190Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 76.
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General Cushman observed that Schwarzkopf had
essentially three options in terms of the command of the
three U.S. corps-sized formations that comprised his land
forces:
(1) He could create a separate land forces
commander.
(2) He could double-hat himself as land forces commander,
directly commanding ArCent/Third Army and MarCent/I MEF,
both of which would have operational and logistic
responsibilities. (ArCent, commanding the 22nd Support
Command, also would have a theater logistic responsibi-
lity.)
(3) He could take direct operational control of the Army
corps - orders for operations would come directly from
and corps battle reports would flow directly to Schwarz-
kopf's command center. Yeosock would assist Schwarzkopf
in planning; he would stay entirely current on plans and
operations; he would with all his assets support the
corps, but he would not decide on or direct the corps'
operations.191
Cushman argued that
[ihn August 1990, with a one-corps Third Army, General
Schwarzkopf chose the second option. When it later became
clear that he would have a two-corps Third Army, he stayed
with that choice, bringing in a three-star Deputy
CinCCent, Lieutenant General Calvin A. H. Waller, to
relieve himself of some of the details of land force
direction and air/land coordination.192
Thus, I MEF, a two-division (with a U.S. Army armor brigade
reinforcing) corps-equivalent which also included a heavily-
reinforced Marine Aircraft Wing of over 500 aircraft
19 1Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 78.
192Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 78.
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(including more than 200 fixed-wing jets) was organized as a
separate operational maneuver element from the U.S. Third
Army, which by D-Day included nine U.S. divisions organized
into two corps.193
General Cushman conceded that there were powerful
factors that supported such a decision:
[t]he CINC was doing high policy and theater strate-
gy; he was in daily touch with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; he needed to work personally with the
Saudis, British, French, Navy, Marines, and all the rest;
he had the key role dealing with the media, he had to
supervise the air war's planning and execution. He could
reasonably have said that there were not enough hours in
the day for him to take on this part of General Yeosock's
established duties.
Cushman continued that Schwarzkopf
could also say that, in principle, the CinC is not a
war fighter; that strategic, not operational, direction is
his role; that he surveys the scene, allocates forces,
and provides mission guidance. [emphasis mine]
Further,
he could claim that directing the operations of the
corps of his Army component was not his business but
rather the job of his Army component commander, who had
the resources and the expertise for that task (even though
that would place another command center, located in Riyadh
not far from his own - itself 300 miles from the fight -
in the chain between the CinC and his frontline Army
commanders, inevitably delaying and possibly garbling
battle reports and orders).194
Cushman concluded that Schwarzkopf's decision to
allow the ArCent/Third Army headquarters to serve as an
"
93Freidman, 304-5.
194Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 78.
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operational command was inevitably destined to create,
rather than solve, command and control problems once the
ground phase of the campaign kicked off. Cushman stated
that
in mid-February - when it was clear that the war's
end might come quickly upon launching the ground attack -
it became essential that Schwarzkopf himself direct the
two corps [of the Third Army]. By then he had the free
time to do it, and he had the "trusted" General Waller,
who "had come up through the Army as an armor officer."
From a forward command post, Waller, as Deputy CinC,
could help Schwarzkopf exercise fingertip touch. Yeosock
could support by, for example, providing staff expertise
for a land operations cell in Schwarzkopf's command
center. 195
The results of the air campaign of DESERT STORM,
while perhaps less contentious than the outcome of the
ground campaign, are nevertheless also still the subject of
some debate. Schwarzkopf, in accordance with the latitude
permitted to him under Goldwater-Nichols, appointed
CENTAF/CG 9th Air Force Commander Charles Horner as the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), with
responsibilities and authority "for 'planning, coordination,
and tasking' of all the air in the force, regardless of its
service".1 96 For the first time in practice, this authority
19 5Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 78-79.
196Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 76.
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would include the tasking of aircraft carrier-based naval
aviation as well as sea-launched cruise missiles.1 97
Despite problems communicating the massive air
tasking order (ATO) to all the relevant air units throughout
the theater, the JFACC system on the surface appeared to
work in a satisfactory manner. One could make the argument
that DESERT STORM did not really 'stress' the system, and
thus the verdict in many ways is still out. In response to
Navy criticisms, the Air Force in the last several years has
modified the computer-assisted force management system
(CAFMS) used during DESERT STORM, but the overall JFACC
system will again be utilized in the next conflict.
One of the traditional problems that seemed to be
avoided in Southwest Asia was the Air Force-Marine battle
over the control of Close Air Support (CAS) assets, but this
probably was due more to the fact that there was no shortage
of available aircraft (with almost a thousand CAS-capable
tactical aircraft ashore and six carriers and two LHAs worth
of aircraft afloat) to support both Army and Marine
requirements with plenty to spare. In fact, it appears
that, at least in the Marine case, the biggest aviation
problem was the lack of adequate ramp space to park the
hundreds of tactical and transport aircraft in theater.
19 7Cushman, "Desert Storm's End Game," 77.
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If it had not been for the extraordinary military
aviation infrastructure already in place throughout the
Arabian Peninsula, the battle over the control of Marine and
Navy strike and multi-mission aircraft such as the A-6 and
the F/A-18 would likely have been intense. The Marines
quite predictably would have argued that the strategic
bombing and air interdiction campaigns must not be
prosecuted completely at the expense of effective CAS for
the ground war, while the Air Force would have maintained
that 'strategic' targets deserved the higher priority in the
larger scheme of things. The Navy, wanting to 'play' in the
big air war, yet at the same time not wanting to publicly
undercut the Marines, would in the end likely have straddled
the issue.
4. Implications for the Future
The American military experience since the passage
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act seems to suggest that 'unity of
command' is still evolving as a concept. Even within
established unified theaters, actions by the theater CinCs
in both JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM indicate that
dividing up an AOR along service lines is still the
preferred method o4 operation, and that tremendous pressure
still exists for CinCs to command through service - vice
functional - component commanders.
117
Despite Goldwater-Nichols, not one of the theater
boundaries of the geographic unified commands established
before 1986 has been altered, even though both the strategic
rationale and the service prerogatives present at their
creation have been utterly transformed by events of the last
few years. Even the Southern Command, which several times
has been spared extinction despite the repeated (and
extraordinarily rare, at least when it comes to UCP issues)
consensus of the JCS to the contrary, appears to be in a
position to survive as a unified command - this despite the
withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Panama scheduled for
the end of this decade.
Perhaps the fundamental problem is that the
individual services still create, train, and develop
doctrine for their operational forces relatively independent
of centralized control and without a common doctrinal
approach. By extension, they also plan for their employment
in a single-service manner, with the minimum possible
contact with the other services below the component
headquarters. Thus, the Army pushes its five-division rapid
deployment corps, the Air Force promotes its new composite
wings and argues that a force consisting of X number of B-2s
might have single-handedly (by implication) been able to
halt the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the Marine Corps
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nervously looks over its shoulders at the first two,
maintaining that it is already the nation's "9-1-1" rapid
deployment outfit and has operated "composite" wings for
years. Only the Navy, reeling from the Tailhook '91
scandal, the cancellation of the A-12 program, and the loss
of its only credible open-ocean foe with the collapse of the
USSR, has publicly admitted in its "From the Sea..." white
paper to a future that consists of playing a mostly
supporting (or enabling, in the Navy parlance), rather than
central, role in likely near to mid-term conflicts.
The situation that I have described above suggests
that the 'cart' - namely the interest of the individual
services - is still very much out in front of the 'horse' of
joint warfare all the way from the size and number of
unified commands down through the heavy/light mix of
surviving Army and National Guard divisions and Air Force
wings. Thus, the very actions that most of the services are
taking in order to 'hunker down' and survive the post-Cold
War demobilization are contributing to undercutting of
'jointness' in a way similar to the post-World War II
process. Specialized or 'limited' mission aircraft and
ships - such as battleships, which are very expensive (for
the Navy) to keep in service but bring irreplaceable combat
capabilities to joint operations - are being sacrificed in
favor of more modern multi-mission platforms. While perhaps
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making sense from a single-service perspective, the loss of
these marginal but unique capabilities will be deeply felt
in the next major regional contingency.
The fundamental problem can be boiled down to the
issue of success from the outset in wartime. General Gordon
Sullivan, the current Army Chief of Staff, states the case
for preserving the Army's readiness in terms of the phrase
"no more Task Force Smiths", which refers to the utter
defeat of a woefully unprepared battalion-sized Task Force
thrown in the path of the rapidly advancing North Korean
Peoples Army in July of 1950. That cautionary tale needs to
be rephrased and extended to include the entire American
military's - not just the Army's - experience at the outset
of the Korean War. Since the U.S. military may in a few
short years be in a similar state of poor combat readiness
due to incessant budget cutting and the growing distraction
of 'non-traditional' missions, it is vital that those forces
that can be rushed overseas on precious airlift and sealift
assets can be quickly and effectively employed as the
CinC sees fit in a joint war fighting environment without
undue concern for service parochialism.
To overcome inter-service problems and ensure
success at the outset of hostilities requires a complete
restructuring that starts from the top - the structure of
the Unified Command Plan - and builds down with a conscious
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goal of meeting the operational needs of the CinC and
limiting (or eliminating) the deleterious impact of the
service components on joint war fighting. As such
the final portion of this thesis will focus on various
proposals designed to accomplish a top-down restructuring to
better support post-Cold War joint operations and strategic
requirements.
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V. TOWARD A NEW STRATEGIC FRAmaEWORK
A. CHANGES FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The at times exhaustive review of the previous chapters
on the development of the Unified Command Plan and the range
of possible alternatives presented throughout the last fifty
years is ultimately focused on one goal: to point the way
for the design of a new strategic framework within which the
U.S. will conduct military operations in the post-Cold War
world. There have been several proposals put forward in the
past few years that in part address this goal, and some
changes have even been put into effect with dispatch once
the services' opposition have been accommodated or
overruled.
1. The Base Force and the Entablisbment of the U.S.
Strategic Comnand
In the wake of the Gulf War, JCS Chairman General
Colin Powell moved forward with an aggressive program of UCP
reform which had been under continuous development since
1989. Upon his accession to the Chairmanship, General
Powell acted quickly to develop a post-Cold War framework in
which the need for America's security role in the world and
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its remaining military forces could be articulated and
justified.
This framework - known as the Base Force - was
"intended to ccavey that his proposed force structure
represented a floor below which the United States could not
go and still carry out its responsibilities as a superpower,
rather than as a ceiling from which it could further reduce
its forces". The Base Force was presented in terms of four
conceptual force packages: the Atlantic Force, the Pacific
Force, Strategic Forces, and the Contingency Force.
Providing a presence in Europe and the Persian
Gulf, the Atlantic Force would be composed of mobility
forces, backed by U.S.-based heavy reinforcements
oriented toward Eurasia. Supplemented by U.S.-based
reinforcements, the Pacific Force would provide a
land-based presence in Korea and Japan, together with
maritime bases and presence in the Pacific region. A
modified triad, relying primarily on sea-based systems,
would comprise the Strategic Forces, while the Contin-
gency Force would be composed of U.S.-based predomi-
nantly light forces, deployed maritime forces, mobility
forces, and special operations forces."9"
As part of the institution of this conceptual
force package, che Bush Administration in late 1991
announced the merger of the Navy's Ballistic Missile
Submarine Forces with those of the Air Force's Strategic Air
Command. The new organization created out of this marriage
"198Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force
1989-1992 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993) 21.
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- the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) - was designated
as a Unified Command and assumed operational control of all
strategic nuclear forces in June 1992."'
This move represented the first major UCP
reorganization of the post-Cold War era, and it helped set
the stage for the further consolidation of service-dominated
Specified Commands into Unified Commands. The Chairman's
tri-annual report to the Secretary of Defense and Congress
on the roles, missions, and functions of the armed services,
which was due to be delivered in the winter of 1992-1993,
provided further means to push the reorganization of
the UCP in the direction of the Base Force.
General Powell, riding on a crest of prestige not
enjoyed by a serving officer in many years and greatly
empowered by Goldwater-Nichols, was presented with a rare
opportunity to effect far-reaching changes in the
organization, mission, and employment of American military
forces. In the end, he chose not to take unilateral action
in this area and instead worked within the joint planning
system of the JCS. What emerged was a consensus document
that by and large attempted to defend the current structure
and missions of the four services.
"'Michael B. Perini, "SAC Adjusts to a Post-Cold War
Era," Airman January 1992, 13.
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2. The EVolution of the U.S. Atlantic Command
Although General Powell's "Roles and Missions"
Review came down generally on the side of the status quo, an
important exception to that trend was his recommendation to
restructure the mission - although not the AOR - of the U.S.
Atlantic Command. Under this plan, which was quickly
endorsed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the Air Combat
Command (ACC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) would become
full-time subordinate service components of LANTCOM (as is
currently the Atlantic Fleet). As part of this process,
FORSCOM would lose its status as a specified command, but
both it and ACC would pick up new joint warfighting
component responsibilities in addition to performing their
more traditional role of providing trained and ready forces
to the theater CINCs. Fleet Marine Force Atlantic
(FMFLANT), which serves as the Marine "type" command of the
Atlantic Fleet, would obtain a voice at the 'joint" table
through the 'dual-hatting' of CG, FMFLANT as Commander,
Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) 20 0
While retaining its current AOR and NATO supreme
command function, LANTCOM also becomes responsible for the
2 0 0Paul David Miller, "A New Mission for Atlantic
Command," Joint Force Quarterly Summer 1993, 80-87.
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joint training and readiness of all CONUS-based conventional
forces, less those stationed on the west coast under the
command of the U.S. Pauific Fleet. To better reflect its
more balanced joint focus and completion, the post of
USCINCLANT will become an any-service nominative position
(it is a Navy post by tradition, not statute) when the
serving CINC, Admiral Paul David Miller, has completed his
term of office. The changes to LANTCOM's mission and
structure were put into effect on 1 October 1993.
The seeds of this reorganization go back at least as
far as the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the previous
incarnations of ACC and FORSCOM had served on a temporary
basis as service components of LANTCOM. What is quite
different about this arrangement is that, unlike the Navy
and Marine components, both ACC and FORSCOM now have
extensive control over and responsibilities for Guard
and Reserve readiness and integration. This arguably
produces a different outlook from the active forces-
orientation of the sea services, and with the ever-
increasing reliance on mobilization forces, one has to
consider whether or not ACC and FORSCOM can adequately
manage both a ready "warfighting" mission and the reserve
mobilization mission.
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3. Outside Proposals on UCP Reorganization
In a monograph recently published by the Henry L.
Stimson Center entitled Key West Revisited: Roles and
Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Twenty-first
Century, the authors argue for a complete revision of the
Unified Command Plan based on the need for the U.S. to
"tailor its forces to meet a new array of military threats
and to exploit continuing technological developments". 20 '
The outline of that report's recommendations are:
A) a Contingency Forces Command, to be comprised of;
(1) the Air Combat Command,
(2) the Army's Forces Command,
(3) the Atlantic Fleet,
(4) the Pacific Fleet, and
(5) an Army Peacekeeping Command.
(B) Three Geographic Commands;
(1) the Atlantic Command,
(2) the Pacific Command, and
(3) the Central Command.
(C) the Strategic Command, to include;
(1) the Air Force Space Command, and
(2) a Continental Defense Command, and
(D) the Special Operations Command.
In regard to the U.S. Transportation Command, the
report states that
20
'Barry M. Blechman et al., Key West Revisited: Roles
and Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Twenty-first
Century, Report No.8 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993) 13.
127
[t]hought should be given to the need for this uni-
fied command. An alternative would be to maintain
specified Air Force and Navy Commands for airlift and
sealift, respectively, as part of the Contingency Forces
command.2 10
The mission of the Contingency Forces Command would be
to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of
all U.S. ground, sea, and air forces - both active and
reserve. Services would continue to recruit, organize,
train, and maintain those deployed in the United States
in peacetime. The Contingency Forces Command, however,
would be responsible for developing joint doctrine, for
ensuring the compatibility of equipment, and for planning
and carrying out joint training and integrated exercises
in the United States. 20 3
In regard to the geographic commands, the report offers
little in the way of detail concerning their boundaries,
other than to suggest that, with the imminent departure of
U.S. forces from Panama, Southern Command's AOR could then
be included in the Atlantic Command's. 20 4 Surprisingly, the
role of the European Command in this new structure is not
specifically mentioned either way in the report, although
one might infer that it would be relegated to a sub-unified
command of LANTCOM along the lines of the U.S. Forces Korea
- PACOM relationship.
202Key West Revisited, 16.
21 3Key West Revisited, 16.
2
°
4Key West Revisited, 16. (see footnote 6)
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Taking a different tack is Richard Holloran, a
former military correspondent for the New York Times, who in
1990 (before Desert Shield/Storm) focused not on theater-
level command issues but instead on the restructuring of
conventional forces based in the U.S..205 He argued that
future wars in which American forces would fight would not
be in Korea or Western Europe, which due to their wealth and
power are more and more capable of defending themselves, but
rather in the Third World.
With this as his perspective, he called for a more
effective grouping of U.S.-based conventional forces to
better deal with the post-Cold War challenges for the U.S.
military presented by warfare in the Third World. He
envisioned a CONUS-based Army in which, by the year 2000,
the light forces will be organized into two corps-
sized expeditionary forces - one on the Atlantic Coast
and one on the Pacific. Each expeditionary force will
contain a light infantry, an airborne, an air assault,
and a marine division, plus robust combat support and





5Richard Halloran, "An Army for the Twenty-first
Century," in The United States Army: Challenges and Missions
for the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991) Edited




A reinvigorated army in the year 2000 will have
resolved the issue of close air support in one of two
ways: by recapturing the mission, the pilots, and the
airplanes from the Air Force and integrating them into
air-ground teams like the Marine Corps or by giving up
on the air force and relying on helicopters, long-range
artillery, and precision-guided missiles for battlefield
interdiction.2""
As part of this restructuring toward "light" and
"expeditionary" forces, the Navy and the Air Force would be
required to dedicate vastly increased resources toward
expanding the nation's strategic airlift and sealift
capacity. The Army's heavy forces would be either
converted to light units or placed partially in the
reserves.
Recognizing that he was calling for some
extraordinary changes in the way the four services do
things, Holloran nevertheless maintained that it must be
done because
... the United States cannot afford, either mili-
tarily or financially, to underwrite the growing bickering
between the army and the Marine Corps over the expedition-
ary mission or another duplication of effort. The United
States needs both, and needs both to work together in
common cause. 
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To ensure that the services came on board, "command of an








tradition that prevails in the armed forces, in rotation to
a lieutenant general from each of the corps, four elements"
as would the other key positions on the staff.2"'
Morton H. and David Halperin in 1985 approached the
problem in a third manner.21 Seeing the roles and missions
compromises reached at the urging of then-Defense Secretary
Forrestal during the famous conference at Key West in 1948
as the source of many (if not most) of the unity of command
problems since the end of the Second World War, the
Halperins recommended that this agreement be completely
restructured. They argued that
the basic principle that should guide any reform
effort is that no branch of the military should have to
rely on other branches in order to carry out its duties.
No longer should the services be expected to divert money
from programs they care about the most in order to
provide support for rival services. No longer should
senseless turf rules prevent the services from carrying
out their primary functions."' (emphasis mine]
As a consequence, the Army would be free to procure





21 0David H. and Morton Halperin, "Rewriting the Key West
Accord," in Reoraanizina America's Defense: Leadership in
War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985)
Edited by Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel
Huntington, pp. 344-358.
21David H. and Morton Halperin, 355.
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well as strategic sealift ships. The Navy and Marines would
be able to concentrate on sea control and power projection
missions, while the Air Force would be able to devote its
time and energy on strategic bombing and air superiority
missions.
4. An Asses=ment of Current Initiatives
Although many interesting and thought-provoking
proposals such as the ones surveyed in the previous section
have surfaced in the last several years, most are highly
unrealistic because they either call for the massive
restructuring of one or more of the armed services or they
attempt to impose a bureaucrati, solution to the issue of
unity of command that subordinates major service
administrative headquarters to a super-unified command.
In the case of the latter approach, solutions such
as those proposed in Key West Revisited or recently
undertaken at the Atlantic Command tend to run against the
grain of recent experience in non-military areas. Using
American business as an example - perhaps a risky one, given
some its problems - U.S. corporations are now finding that
downsizing and decentralization is the method that best
allows their individual product managers to react quickly
and efficiently to the demands of a rapidly changing market
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place. In contrast, the solution instituted at LANTCOM
involves the consolidation of three very different service
bureaucracies (or four, if you count the Marine Forces
Component) under one headquarters.
The closest civilian equivalent to this solution
might be to consolidate GM, Ford, and Chrysler under one
"super" corporate headquarters - without significantly
reducing the individual companies' authority to develop
their own products - and then expect a superior common
product to be produced, or even a multitude of different
products with common components. Needless to say, even GM
seems to have learned that this approach does not lead to a
better automobile, and thus it has made a significant effort
not only to reduce the size of its work force, but to
empower those corporate divisions that remain with greater
latitude to focus on their market niche. I believe that
there lies within this experience a lesson from which the
American military can profit.
At the other extreme lies the approach suggested by
the Halperins, which essentially advocates that the
individual services each develop the ability to wage war
more or less independent of the others. They maintained
that allowing each to argue for and devote resources to
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their preferred missions would result in focused, capable
fielded forces.
The problem with this approach is first that, with the
defense budget in a precipitous decline with no real end-
state in sight (remember how long the Base Force remained
the bottom line), highly-specialized forces that don't
employ fighters or tanks will be further marginalized or
will disappear entirely, only to be rediscovered as an
urgent combat requirement when a major war erupts. Mine
warfare, special operations forces, and combat search and
rescue are but three examples of important missions that
have in times past been allowed to decline in such a
decision-making environment.
The second and more important objection to this
approach is that, with the number of active formations
declining to a fifty-year low and their readiness,
reconstitution, and training state likely to follow the same
trend, the U.S. military is rapidly approaching a point
where it cannot afford to lose the first big battle of the
next war because it may not be able to recover for years.
One way to prevent or at least ameliorate such a setback
under the conditions that I have related is to ensure that
all of the units that we expend precious strategic air and
sea lift on in order to bring them into a theater are able
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to be fully integrated into a joint team and employed in a
flexible mainer by the CinC. The only way to ensure that
this will be the case is to establish a system of peacetime
joint command that maintains the maximum contact and
interoperability between the warfighting forces of each of
the services - not simply at the four-star service
component commander staff level.
Thus, the formation in peacetime of mixed combat
organizations, such as those proposed by Richard Holloran,
would provide the most effective instrument for joint
warfighting, although his particular approach is far too
radical to get past the service bureaucracies and their
Congressional and industry supporters. Also, a glaring
inconsistency in his argument is the absence of a Marine Air
Wing - which he cites later as a desirable solution in
regard to the Army's CAS problem - from his proposed joint
Army-Marine Expeditionary Corps.
A more successful approach may be to continue to de-
emphasize the combat role of service components and
concentrate instead on increasing operational interaction at
the one-and two-star level, particularly between the Army
and Marine Corps. This would help preserve service identity
at the division, wing, and battle group level, yet still
facilitate further interoperability at the two- and three-
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star, rather than four-star, level of coordination.
Boosting greater confidence at this level is where
measurable progress can be best achieved without unduly
threatening service prerogatives or survival.
B. THE ALTERNATIVZ: A NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWRK
1. Three Conceptual Groups of Forces: Theater,
Regional, and Strategic
Samuel P. Huntington, in a 1984 article titled
Organization and Strategy, called for the establishment of
"mission commands, not area commands". 21 2 Noting that "the
current structure of unified and specified commands thus
often tends to unify things that should not be unified and
to divide things that should be under single command",
Huntington argues that while some degree of divided command
is inevitable, "the problem is to identify that form of
division that is least injurious to the accomplishment of
the mission at hand".2 3
Huntington's view of that approach was to follow the
Soviet method of unity of command, in which
212Samuel P. Huntington, "Organization and Strategy,"
Public Interest, Spring 1984. Reprinted in Reorganizing
America's Defenses: Leadership in War and Peace (Robert J.
Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, Editors)
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985) 251.
113Huntington, 250.
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in some cases the services are responsible for opera-
tional missions and in other cases they are not. In
keeping with this general approach, unified and specified
commands should normally be organized in terms of mission,
not area, and the scope of a command should be extended to
all forces directly relevant to its mission.11 4 [emphasis
mine]
As an example, he offered that
(t]he Strategic Air Command, for instance, should be
converted into a strategic retaliatory command incorpora-
ting the ballistic missile submarines that are now
assigned to three other commands. In keeping with the
recommendations of various groups, the military airlift
command might also be changed into a logistics command
including sealift and related activities as well as
airlift.21
We of course now recognize these entities as the U.S.
Strategic Command and the U.S. Transportation Command.
In regard to the geographic commands, Huntington
advocated this approach:
[tihe Atlantic Command... should be converted into
a purely naval Atlantic sea control command, with that
as its only mission. Responsibility for force projec-
tion and amphibious operations in countries bordering
the Atlantic, on the other hand, should be transferred
to the readiness or Southern commands. There is also
little logic in the writ of the European command extend-
ing over all of Africa and a good part of the Middle
East. The European command should be directed to the
defense of Europe. Given the importance of the area, a
separate Middle East-Levantine command would clearly be






commands should be limited to areas within which one
mission is overwhelmingly dominant.216 (emphasis mine]
While I disagree with some of his prescriptions and others
have been rendered moot by the demise of the Cold War, I
believe that Huntington's basic thesis - that geographical
commands should be limited to areas within which one mission
is dominant - is an excellent foundation for a restructured
UCP.
2. Theater Forces
What would such a system of mission-oriented,
limited geographical area commands look like? If one
accepts currently-espoused U.S. grand strategy as the basis
for the structuring of limited-area unified commands, then
the answer is clear. There are three areas of the world
that the U.S. has openly declared to be of such vital
national interest that - even after the collapse of the USSR
- it is automatically willing to throw U.S. troops into the
line of fire in their defense: Western Europe, Southwest
Asia, and Northeast Asia.217 These three geographical areas
1 6Huntington, 251.
217see Press Release entitled Secretary Asnin Announces
Bottom UD Review Results, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1 September
1993) 5-6 for summary of major regional contingencies
(MRCs).
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are "theaters of military operations" in the traditional
use of the word, and as such they truly deserve the title of
Theater Commands in the Unified Command Plan of the "New
World Order".
In Western Europe, the U.S. is still bound to the
collective defense of the region through NATO, although the
rationale behind this commitment is under increasing
challenge at home. Recent efforts to transform the alliance
into a European collective security organization or to
expand its charter to include an out-of-area mission have
been at best marginally successful. But for the purposes of
this thesis, the future of NATO is largely irrelevant. The
fact that bears on this thesis is that U.S. forces will
continue to be firmly wedded to European defense for the
foreseeable future (the 'Bottom Up Review' commits to a
figure of 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe and 98,000 in
Northeast Asia) as an insurance policy against the
political situation taking a sudden turn for the worse.
The question remains as to what should be the limits
of the European Theater Command's area of responsibility
(AOR). If the framework proposed by Huntington were
adopted, then both the Levant and Africa (with the exception
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of its northern coastal region) should remain out of EUCOM's
new AOR. During the Cold War, the inclusion of these areas
in the former's AOR served some larger strategic purpose in
the context of an anticipated global NATO-Warsaw Pact war
that would be centered on the North German plain. It now
clearly serves no such purpose other than perhaps to keep
the EUCOM staff occupied in what is - for the time being,
at least - a relatively quiet theater in terms of military
operations, although a commitment of U.S. forces in the
former Yugoslavia would change this. In addition to its
new, more focused AOR, EUCOM should retain an area of
interest (AOI) that extends eastward to the Ural Mountains,
because political and military events in Eastern Europe will
continue to directly impact on Western European security for
years to come.
Southwest Asia, for the last ten years the
responsibility of the U.S. Central Command, clearly falls
within Huntington's limited area framework. If there is any
problem with the AOR of CENTCOM in this context, it is that
it was too limited by virtue of the grafting of Israel,
Lebanon, and Syria to EUCOM after the merging of NELM's AOR
into the former in 1963. The time is ripe for this
'natural' part of the Middle East to fall within the AOR
of CENTCOM, although the bordering areas of the
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Mediterranean Sea could remain under the control of EUCOM
until otherwise directed in order to ensure proper
coordination of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-
surface warfare (ASUW) on NATO's southern flank. On the
other side of the region, it appears that Pakistan would
best be left out of CENTCOM's AOR due to its long history of
peaceful relations with Iran and since most of its pressing
security concerns are with its South Asian neighbors.
Northeast Asia, which is best defined as that
strategic (in U.S. terms) area of the world that encompasses
the intersection of Japan, Manchurian China, the Korean
Peninsula, and the Russian Far East, also falls easily
within Huntington's limited-area framework. Like Europe,
nearly 100,000 U.S. military personnel are projected to
remain in the region even after the Secretary Aspin's 1993
"Bottom Up Review" of force structure and strategy. Unlike
Europe, Northeast Asia continues to be a tension-filled area
where the U.S. could find itself enmeshed in a major war,
potentially within the space of a few days or even hours.
Current American strategic thought envisions that rather
than reinforce South Korea with a huge U.S. field army at
the outset of renewed hostilities in Korea, the initial
intent would be to largely limit U.S. military activity to
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air and naval strikes in support of the ROK Army - with
Japan serving as both a base and a sanctuary.
While the forward-based forces in Korea and Japan
currently belong to separate sub-unified commands of the
U.S. Pacific Command, the operational environment in this
region is so fundamentally different from the rest of the
Pacific region as to warrant a separate unified command.
This command, which I propose to call the Northeast Asia
Theater Command, should have an AOR that includes both
Koreas, the Japanese Islands and their surrounding waters,
as well as an area of interest (AOI) that would include much
of the Russian Far East and Eastern Manchuria. It should
not include Taiwan, which has a traditional albeit
downgraded bi-lateral defense relationship with the U.S.
which is unrelated to the immediate defense of South Korea
and Japan, nor should it include the other countries of East
and Southeast Asia.
3. Regional (or Area) Comandu
With the aforementioned "theater commands" defined
in terms of a limited-area, single-mission charter, this
raises the question of how the rest of the world might be
approached in terms of unified military command. As it
turns out, the remaining areas of the world are largely
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characterized (in military terms) by a series of bilateral
relations between the U.S. and individual countries. Even
the Rio Treaty falls within this category, since it was
fashioned in terms of a common defense of the Western
Hemisphere against outside (read Soviet) aggression.
In the post-Cold War world, the external military threat to
that hemisphere seems virtually non-existent. Thus any
pattern of conflict there in the future will likely revert
to that of the intra-American feuds of the 19th and early
20th centuries or perhaps a civil war in Cuba. With the
last U.S. combat troops scheduled to depart Panama by the
end of the decade, the absence of 'trip-wire' forces will
mean that the U.S. will retain some flexibility (in theory)
before responding to any inter-Latin American wars, and then
on a case-by-case basis.
The question remains how then to divide up the
"rest" of the world in a way that ensures effective unity of
command when required. Clearly there is no further need
for the Southern Command under the set of circumstances
described above, and the Atlantic Command appears to be
equally without a major (aside from the ever-present Cuban
and Haitian contingencies) mission with the disappearance of
the Soviet Northern Fleet from the North Atlantic. Due to
the ever-present possibility of a major war in South Asia,
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the Pacific Command seems to still have a somewhat relevant
mission, even if Northeast Asia were amputated from its AOR
as I have proposed. This is not to suggest that the U.S.
necessarily has to throw its weight behind one combatant or
another, but rather that it may have to attempt leverage
against both in order to limit the spread of the conflict
and prevent its escalation to the use of weapons of mass
destruction. Managing the military response to such a
conflict would certainly require the full attention of a
unified command consisting mainly of a large naval
component.
One way for the U.S. to organize the remainder of
the world into an acceptable unified command arrangement
would be to divide it into two areas or regions; Atlantic
and Pacific. The Pacific Regional (or Area) Command would
include the present AOR of PACOM 1.:ss the proposed Northeast
Asia Theater Command. Unlike the present PACOM, its western
boundary would end well off the east coast of Africa rather
than at the low-tide mark on its shore. The Atlantic
Regional (or Area) Command would be created by merging the
present SOUTHCOM and LANTCOM AORs, as well as the addition
of sub-Saharan Africa and its surrounding waters. Thus,
it would be responsible for military operations in all of
Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa, the waters
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immediately surrounding these areas, and the majority of the
Atlantic Ocean (less the Western Approaches to the U.K.).
(see map in Appendix J)
The primary mission of these regional commands would
be to exercise appropriate command of U.S. forces operating
within their respective AORs, including contingency
planning. A key secondary mission would be to ensure the
security of the air and sea lines of communication between
the U.S. and the three theater commands, as well as to serve
as a supporting command for theater CinCs when directed. In
practice, this would mean that the Pacific Area Command
would support the Northeast Asia Theater while the Atlantic
Area Command would support the European Theater. The
Southwest Asia Theater would continue to be supported by
both the Pacific and Atlantic Commands.
4. rorces (Strategic) Commands
With the three theater and two area commands defined
above, what remains is to decide on the appropriate grouping
of U.S.-based forces. Rather than follow the new Atlantic
Command model, which groups these forces by area (i.e. all
general purrose conventional forces in the U.S., less
specified forces for PACOM), why not proceed along
Huntington's lines and group these forces by mission?
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When one surveys the major conventional forces
stationed throughout the U.S., a general pattern emerges
that suggests that there are meaningful differences between
the various categories of forces in terms of deployability,
sustainability, combat capability, and readiness that should
be considered. Table 1. may help to visualize these
variations. The 'early arrival' end of the spectrum
includes units such as the Army's Light and Airborne
Divisions, Air Force Composite Wings, Navy 'ready' Carrier
Battle Groups, and Marine Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS)
Brigades and Air Contingency Forces that can begin to arrive
at a trouble spot within days or hours of a Presidential
decision to do so, depending on the level of threat and the
sophistication of the receiving ports and airfields. Using
Desert Storm as a model, these are the "0-to-30 day" rapid
deployment forces in the U.S. military inventory.
Toward the middle of the spectrum are 'medium' units
such as the Army's 101st Air Assault and 24th (Mechanized)
Infantry Divisions, which are (or will soon be) configured
to move quickly by sea and air to either join up with
forward assault elements or deploy in a 'permissive' area
of a theater. Also in this grouping are the XVIII Airborne
Corps Headquarters and combat support echelons, the MPS-
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TABLE 1. Notional Deployment Timeline for
U.S.-Based Forces
Notional Deployment Timetable (in days)
0 ....... 30 ...... 60 ...... 90 ...... 120 ..... 150 ..... 180+
Army 10th 82nd 24th 1st 4th
Mountain Airborne Infantry Infantry Infantry
Division Division (Mech)Div (Mech)Div (Mech)Div
25th 101st 1st 2nd National
Infantry Air Assault Cavalry Armored Guard
(Light)Div Division Division Division (Mech)Div
XVIII Corps I Corps III Corps






(+ support) (+ support)
Nav CVBG(x3) CVBG(x2) CVBG(x3) CVBG(x2) CVBG(Res)
USAF Wing(C) Wing(F) Wing(B) Wing(T)
Wing (C) Wing (T)
#AirForce HQ
(+ support)
based Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Headquarters with
their organic support units, afloat Marine Expeditionary
Brigades to "kick in the front door" if required, additional
specialized and partly-reserve Air Force and Air National
Guard wings and groups (such as the F-4G "Wild Weasel" and
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A-10 wings), and reinforcing second echelon naval battle
force units. Again using DESERT SHIELD as a model, these
might fairly be referred to as "30-to-90" day forces,
because this figure represents their approximate deployment
time from the U.S. to distant theaters.
Toward the far end of the spectrum are the Army
Divisions with "roundout" National Guard Brigades, Army
National Guard combat brigades and divisions, Army and Air
Force Reserve combat support and combat service support
formations, Naval Reserve Force minesweepers, frigates, and
aircraft squadrons (and soon an aircraft carrier), and
Marine Reserve forces. All require a certain amount of
personnel augmentation as well as additional individual and
unit training before they can be effectively employed in a
theater of war. They can be best described as "90-day
plus", because under the best conditions it would take at
least 90 days before a CinC would even see these forces in
his theater of operations, and even then, he might not have
complete faith in their ability to satisfactorily complete
assigned combat missions.
There is of course a degree of artificiality in the
deployment spectrum presented above, because when a
particular division or wing arrives in theater is highly
dependent upon its relative value (and thus its airlift and
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sealift priority) to the CINC. The Air Force does not
follow as strong of a deployment pattern as the other
services, because even its reserve and guard units are
maintained in a relatively high state of readiness. But
while the Air Force has a great degree of latitude about
which of its combat wings are deployed to a distant theater
in a crisis, theater reception base constraints and the high
portion of its sustaining support forces in the reserves can
be mitigating factors in deployment flows.
The forces shown in the Table 1. above were
representative of the forces available for deployment to
the Arabian Peninsula in late 1990 and early 1991. If
strategic planning is revised to take into account the
recommendations of the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) as the maximum U.S. conventional force level by
the end of this decade, then the active combat forces will
consist of 11 (+1 reserve) aircraft carriers, 10 divisions,
13 Fighter Wings, and 5 MEBs. 21 8
21The Army in late 1992 announced a plan to
dramatically increase the deployability of U.S-based forces
through the use of 20 new high-speed transport ships and a
fleet of 120 C-17 airlifters. The goal was "to deploy five
divisions (1 light, 1 airborne, 1 air assault, and 2 mechan-
ized] plus their supporting combat units, logistics troops
and supplies, to the theater withi 5 days. See Neil
Munro, "U.S. Army Steps Up Efforts to Bolster Rapid
Deployment," Defense News August 24-30, 1992, 10.
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Assuming that the portion of these forces based in
CONUS is 6 divisions (plus one in Hawaii), 7 fighter wings,
10 (+1) carriers, and 4 MEBS, they could be grouped in
several Forces Commands along common deployability and
readiness criterion. The result of such a grouping of
forces might look something like the following:
Rapid Expeditionary or Strategic
Deployment Early Reinforcing Mobilization
(D-Day to D+30) (D+30 to D+90) (D+90 or more)
Forces Forces Forces
Army 10thMtnDiv(Lt) 24thInfDiv(Mech)* lstInfDiv(Mech)(-)
82ndAirborneDiv 101stAirAsltDiv 1st Cavalry Div(-)
USMC 6th MEB(MPS)** 4thMEB(Amphibious) MarineReserveForce
7th MEB(MPS) 5thMEB(Amphibious) 4th Marine Div
1st MEB(MPS) I MEF/lMarDiv/3MAWHQ 4thMarAirWing
IIMEF/2MarDiv/2MAWHQ 4thForServeSupGru





USAF Wing(Composite) Fighter Wing(x4) Fighter Wing(x2)
Wing(Composite) Bomber Wing(x2) Bomber Wing(x )
Tanker Wing(x2) Tanker Wing(x )
Notes: * Lead Echelons of 24th would deploy by Fast Sealift
Ships (FSS). It is assumed that, in dropping from
12 to 10 active divisions, the Army will remove
two 'heavy' division headquarters, leaving 7 U.S.-
based active divisions plus several brigades.
** MPS=Maritime Prepositioned Ships with equipment
and 30 days supply for a 13,000 man Marine Expe-
ditionary Brigade flown in from U.S..
***The assumption is that two or three CVBGs would
already be forward-deployed to the theater CinCs;
two more would be immediately deployable from
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CONUS, four would require a month or two to
complete training and work-ups, one or two would
be in the shipyard for 4-6 months, and one would
be in multi-year overhaul and/or refueling.
If the Expeditionary or Early-Reinforcing Forces are
further divided according to geographic base, an interesting
pattern begins to appear. Currently based in the states of
the southeastern seaboard (VA, NC, SC, GA, and FL) are the
five aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) of the 2nd
Fleet, the 24th Infantry Division, the division, aircraft
wing, and service support group of the Second Marine
Expeditionary Force (II MEF), and wings of the 9th Air
Force. Located in states along the Pacific coast (AL, WA,
OR, and CA) are major units including five CVBGs of the 3rd
Fleet, the division, air wing, and service support group of
the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), the
headquarters of I Corps with several scattered active light
infantry brigades (plus the 25th Division in Hawaii), and
half a dozen fighter and bomber wings of the 11th and 12th
Air Forces.
Other complementary mission and geographic groupings
stand out in this manner. The 82nd Airborne, 101st Air
Assault, and 10th Mountain Divisions are all located within
close proximity along the Appalachian Mountain range, as is
the 23rd Composite Wing at Pope Air Force Base. The 1st
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Cavalry and 1st Infantry Divisions are both located in the
lower Midwest and Southwest (CO, KA, and TX). Most of the
Navy Reserve ships will be based in Gulf Ports by the end of
the decade, as will the Mine Warfare Command. The Marine
Reserve Force headquarters is also now based out of New
Orleans. Again, the geographical distribution of Air Force
combat wings is not as focused, but it has reinforcing
fighter and bomber wings scattered throughout the midwest
and southwest under the command of the 12th Air Force.
Included in that force are one-of-a-kind wings for the
F-117, the F-111/EF-11I, and the F-4G, as well as projected
USAF Reserve and ANG B-IB and B-52 Wings.
With a few minor changes, the U.S. could create four
joint force groupings that are complementary both in mission
and geographic location:
(1) a Rapid Deployment/Contingency Force, based on
the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters but including as
well the 23rd Wing at Pope AFB. The two battalion-sized
Marine Air Contingency Forces (ACFs) on each coast could
also come under the operational control of this RDF when
required.
(2) an Atlantic Expeditionary (or Early Reinforcing)
Force, with 2nd Fleet, II MEF, 9th Air Force, and the 24th
Infantry Division as major operational commands. To
further the cause of "jointness', the 24th ID could be
brought under the operational control of II MEF in order
to form an "Atlantic Expeditionary Corps",
(3) a Pacific Expeditionary (or Early Reinforcing) Force,
with 3rd Fleet, I MEF, l1th Air Force, and I Corps as its
major operational commands. Since I MEF and I Corps have
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different primary operational commitments (I MEF to SWA,
I Corps to Korea) and their closest active units are based
almost 500 miles apart, there is little reason or benefit
to combine them into one Expeditionary Corps headquarters.
(4) a Strategic Mobilization Force, consisting of
partially-active and reserve units such as III Corps,
Naval and Marine Reserve Forces, and Air Force Reserve and
Air National Guard groups.
Compared with General Powell's Base Force, which apportioned
U.S.- based conventional units among the lines of conceptual
Atlantic, Pacific, and Contingency Forces, this proposed
course of action further distills the essential purpose of
these forces and combines them into more cohesive and
focused joint commands.
To complete this process, I propose following
General Cushman's advice to provide
some day-to-day "authority, direction, and control"
of a sizeable all-service joint task force, which they
could then train and otherwise prepare for employment
in the variety of possible conditions under which they
might be required to fight. 2 19
This would best be served by the assignment of the proposed
Atlantic Expeditionary/Early-Reinforcing Force to the
Atlantic Area Command and the Pacific Force to the Pacific
Area Command. In regard to the theater commands, only
CENTCOM would be without sizeable in-place forces, so the
Rapid Deployment/Contingency Force or the Strategic
"'
1 Cushman, Plannina 112.
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Mobilization Forces could be assigned to primarily support
CENTCOM with the understanding that, since the RD/CF's
mission would truly be a worldwide one, this force would
be assigned to other CINCs as the situation dictates.
The remaining U.S.-based forces are already
reasonably grouped along mission lines, so there is little
reason to alter their organization. Strategic Deterrence
and Defense forces have been combined since 1991 into the
U.S. Strategic Command, and it appears that the U.S. Space
Command will soon be merged into that organization as well.
This issue has been a somewhat contentious one with the
Navy, since it fears complete Air Force domination of space
systems that it views as vital to its day-to-day naval
operations, but satisfactory safeguards will probably
be found to assuage those concerns.
The U.S. Transportation Command has since 1987 owned
all of the nation's strategic airlift and sealift forces,
and the U.S. Special Operations Command seems to be
satisfactorily executing its responsibilities for the
nourishment, oversight, advocacy, and coordination of the
services' special operations forces. Both seem to have
achieved - or at least are making good progress toward - the
kind of interoperability and joint perspective deemed
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essential by the crafters of Goldwater-Nichols for the
effective conduct of modern warfare.
This is not to suggest that what is being proposed
would be acceptable to all the services. The apportioning
of significant amounts of air power to the three theater and
two area CINCs clearly runs against the Air Force's
preference for a U.S-based warfighting command. 2 0 Even
within the U.S., the Air Force would prefer to keep its
numbered Air Forces under the centralized command of the Air
Combat Command - which now has a warfighting mission as the
air component of LANTCOM - rather than piecemeal them out to
Area CINCs.
The same objections would likely arise concerning
the establishment of a Northeast Asia Theater. Just as
the Air Force would not want to split off its forces in
Northeast Asia from the control of the Pacific Air Force,
the Navy would not want the Pacific Fleet to lose control of
the 7th Fleet. The Marines would also object to the
20see Barbara Opall, "General Urges Unified U.S.-Based
Command to Direct War," Defense News August 10-16, 1992, 11.
General Loh, the ACC Commander, indicated that "the United
States no longer can afford to assign U.S.-based squadrons
to overseas commands as prescribed by Goldwater-Nichols".
He emphasized that "[tioday, all of my forces are going to
the same war.. .We don't have sufficient forces to allocate
to six different unified commands, so they all have to be
trained and be prepared to fight in a variety of theaters".
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assignment of the Okinawa-based III MEF to the proposed
Northeast Asia Command, preferring as well that it remain
under Fleet Marine Force, Pacific command. Only the Army
would likely find the proposed reorganization acceptable,
since it would give the CINC in Northeast Asia a greater
amount of control over the forces that would have to bear
the brunt of initial combat operations in a war on the
Korean Peninsula.
Assuming that these objections could be overcome or
circumvented, the proposed restructuring of U.S. Unified
Commands and supporting operational-level forces might
appear as follows:
(1) European Theater Command - includes projected in-
theater forces in Europe and the Mediterranean. (see
Appendix B)
(2) Northeast Asia Theater Command - includes projected
in-theater forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. (see
Appendix C)
(3) Southwest Asia Theater Command - includes in-theater
forces plus training/traditional relationship with either
the Rapid Deployment/Contingency Force or the Mobiliza-
tion/Reinforcing Forces Command. (see Appendix D)
(4) Atlantic Area (or Region) Command - includes the
Atlantic Expeditionary/Early Reinforcing Forces Command.
(see Appendix E)
(5) Pacific Area (or Region) Command - includes the
Pacific Expeditionary/Early Reinforcing Forces Command.
(see Appendix F)
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(6) Rapid Deployment (or Contingency) Forces Command -
includes XVIII Corps HQ (serving as a JTF HQ), the 82nd
Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and 10th Mountain Divisions,
the 23rd Wing, and Marine Air Contingency Force units.
(see Appendix G)
(7) Reinforcing (or Mobilization) Forces Command -
includes 'one of a kind' air units and the partially-
manned and mobilization air, sea, and land forces that
comprise the nation's conventional 'strategic reserve'
(see Appendix H)
(8) Strategic Deterrence and Defense Forces Command
(STRATCOM).
(9) Strategic Transportation Forces Command (TRANSCOM)
(10) Special Operations Forces Command (SOCOM).
5. The Role of Service Commands
If the Theater/Area/Forces Unified Command Structure
proposed above were adopted, this would inevitably lead to
the question of the appropriate role of senior service
commands such as Forces Command, Air Combat Command, and Air
Mobility Command. Assuming that these commands serve a
valuable function regarding the support, training, and
administration of the services' fielded forces, how would
they best complement the UCP without dominating it?
If one were to redesign these service commands in
order that they achieve this goal, then one way to do so
would be to leave ACC, Forces Command, and the major naval
commands outside the Unified Commands. They would be
accorded the role of intermediary between the Unified
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Command service component and their respective Chiefs of
Staff and service headquarters.
As part of this realignment, most of the training,
support, and administrative responsibilities of the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleet Headquarters could be consolidated into a
U.S. Fleet Headquarters (similar in principle to the pre-
and early World War II Navy). This revived CINC U.S. Fleet
would be responsible for the traditional "type command"
functions now duplicated in both the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets. These Fleet headquarters, while retaining their
historic titles, would be downgraded to three-star billets
and would be confined to service component - but not war
fighting - functions.
A similar restructuring could be applied to the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Marine Force (FMF) headquarters,
with a consolidated FMF headquarters performing the bulk of
training, support, and administrative functions. For both
the Navy and the Marine Corps, such a reorganization would
help reduce the "bureaucrat-to-warfighter" ratio in each
service as well as to assist in the standardization of the
notoriously independent fleet training and operating
procedures. This proposal is outlined in Appendix I.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Given the primary objective of this thesis - to trace
the evolution of the Unified Command Plan since the start of
the Second World War in order to assess the sources of
change over time - what conclusions can be drawn regarding
the future of unified command? Being that changes to the
UCP have been generated most often by those not in uniform
- be they in the Executive or Legislative Branch - can the
uniformed leadership of the U.S. armed forces build upon the
joint orientation of the Powell tenure as CJCS and
rationalize the UCP, or will change be forced upon it by
impatient outsiders?
At the broadest level of analysis, the evidence points
to the evolutionary nature of unified command. "Jointness"
- spurred on by the Goldwater-Nichols Act - has clearly
gained the upper hand, and it shows no sign of fading into
the background, if the creation of STRATCOM and the
transformation of LANTCOM are any indications. Within
this larger trend, however, are some disturbing signs that
these UCP changes are little more than cosmetic.
The organization and present boundaries of the area
Unified Commands are a prime example. As was mentioned
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earlier in this thesis, there has been no significant
redrawing of UCP boundaries since the creation of CENTCOM
in 1983, yet the geo-strategic situation that the U.S. faces
today is fundamentally different than that of a decade ago.
Absent a major naval threat, the present LANTCOM and PACOM
AORs have little logic to them other than as convenient
boundaries for Naval Specified Commands. Their tendency to
hug the world's coastlines at the low-water mark flies in
the face of the Navy's 1992 "...From the Sea" document,
which emphasizes littoral warfare and de-emphasizes open-
ocean sea control. It is questionable whether the Navy
really gave up - assuming it had any choice in the matter -
anything of value in the recent reorganization of LANTCOM,
(other than a four-star position, of course) given the
remote likelihood of a major contingency in that AOR. It is
also questionable whether "jointness" is really achieved
through that kind of organizational solution.
Without the threat of massed Soviet armies in Central
Europe, EUCOM provides little specific utility other than as
a support for NATO - which is under increasing pressure to
justify its organizational existence - and as a headquarters
for Mediterranean operations. Clearly, the latter could be
performed much more effectively under the purview of a NELM-
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type unified or specified command, at least in purely
military terms.
Also without a plausible external threat, SOUTHCOM's
operational (as opposed to advisory) missions have been
reduced to the support of the faltering war on drugs, a
function that more appropriately could be conducted by a
sub-unified command or a JTF. Only CENTCOM's AOR and
mission remain militarily relevant in the post-Cold War
world, although the inclusion of the Levant would further
improve the integrity of the theater. It is interesting
that this vital area remains short (relative to the other
CINCs) of dedicated forces, although more forces are now
forward-deployed in theater than before DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
Even the internal command organization of the area
Unified Commands retain a service flavor and bias. CINCUNC/
CINC U.S. Forces Korea also serves as his own service
component (8th Army) commander. General Schwarzkopf served
as both the CINC and the de facto Ground Forces Commander,
but if DESERT STORM had occurred during a Marine general's
tenure as CINCCENT, the Army would have undoubtedly pushed
for a separate overall ground forces (read Army) commander.
It is ironic that, even in this new joint environment, an
Army general such as Schwarzkopf can grant a degree of
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autonomy to Marine forces that a Marine CINC could probably
not get away with.
Given these conditions, a reorganization of the UCP is
clearly in order. The proposed framework through which this
should be accomplished - the creation of three Theater, two
Area, and five Forces Commands - offers the best combination
of mission and area of responsibility. At the same time, it
preserves (through the maintenance of Forces Commands) both
the flexibility of the National Command Authority and the
worldwide - rather than 'Atlantic' - focus of units such as
XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, and 12th Air Force.
There are likely to be serious problems with such a
reorganization plan from all the services' perspectives.
The Navy and Marine Corps will likely object to their forces
being labeled as 'regional' rather than 'contingency', even
though these labels are meant to apply to the numbered fleet
or MEF headquarters and not to the individual battle groups
or expeditionary brigades which can readily 'swing' from one
theater to another. If history is a good indicator, the sea
services would also object to Northeast Asia being stood up
as a Unified Command, although to balance this out they
would agree with the merging of SOUTHCOM and LANTCOM.
Losing control of the littoral regions surrounding Korea,
Japan, and the Arabian Peninsula would likewise be unpopular.
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The Army's view would likely be opposite that of the
Navy's and the Marine Corps', but being that the Army has
pressed at times for the re-establishment of a Far Eastern
Command equivalent, this may be a reasonable compromise for
them to make. TLey may also find fault with the designation
of III Corps as a 'mobilization' force, even though the
Clinton Administration clearly favors a heavier reliance on
National Guard "enhanced readiness" brigades that will
increasingly turn this corps into a reserve outfit.
The Air Force may have a strong objection to this
proposal, since as noted earlier it would distribute its
various numbered Air Forces to the theater and area
CINCs. This decentralization would run counter to recent
Air Force attempts to further centralize not only training
but war fighting responsibility in its U.S.-based Air Combat
Command.
In the face of such anticipated service opposition, what
is the value of the proposed UCP reorganization? First and
foremost, it gives more forces and flexibility to the
theater commanders that are charged with executing military
operations and supporting U.S. national security policy in
the exposed areas most vital to the U.S. - Southwest and
Northeast Asia. Second, it draws UCP boundaries where they
can be most easily deconflicted: well out to sea. Third, it
163
effectively differentiates between the unique requirements
derived from fixed, defensive military alliances and those
derived from American bi-lateral and multi-lateral
operations in the rest of the world.
Finally, it preserves American strategic flexibility
through the concentration (in the hands of the Secretary of
Defense and the CJCS, rather than within CINCLANT) the bulk
of the U.S.-based reinforcing and rapid deployment forces.
Rather than taking on an 'Atlantic' focus, these forces, by
remaining directly accountable to the JCS, will retain a
'worldwide' focus more appropriate to their mission.
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"APPENDIX A
ROLZS AND MISSIONS: A PROPOSAL
1. The Relevance of the Iluue
Although an examination of the "roles and missions"
debate could quite easily be the subject of an entirely
separate doctoral dissertation, any discussion of the larger
issues of unity of command would not be complete without at
least touching upon the major points in contention. The
history of this debate in the U.S. military goes back at
least as far as the battle for dominance between the Coastal
Artillery and the Navy in the 19th Century, but for the
purpose of this thesis, a focus on those issues of the last
decade will suffice.
Perhaps the best place to start is with JCS Chairman
General Colin Powell's "Roles, Missions, and Functions of
the Armed Forces of the United States" report of February
1993. In this report, which is a Goldwater-Nichols Act
requirement levied on the CJCS to be submitted to the
Secretary of Defense and the Congress every third year, the
topics covered ranged from the relationship between the USAF
and the "Air Arms" of the other services to the somewhat
more mundane questions on the pros and cons of consolidation
of the various service Chaplain Corps.
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In the areas relating to unity of command, General
Powell defended the roles of the air arms of the Navy, Army,
and Marines, noting that each provides "unique but
complementary capabilities" yet "all work jointly to project
air power". In fact, he sought to strengthen the Army's
position by including attack helicopters as CAS providers
and recommending that doctrine reflect that CAS become a
primary responsibility of all four services. 22' Even the
Marine Corps was spared, with Powell noting that the Corps
was consolidating its fixed-wing aircraft types from nine to
four (F/A-18, AV-8B, EA-6B, and KC-130). This was not a
recent decision, but rather something that the Marines
had been planning to do for the better part of a decade.
The second major issue was the redundancy of the
various theater air defense (missile) programs being
developed by the Army and the Navy and their mutual
interoperability within a theater integrated air defense
system run generally by the Air Force. General Powell's
recommendation was that this issue be examined in more
detail via a Joint Mission Area Analysis.
221see Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of
the Armed Forces of the United States, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, February 1993.
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A third area concerned the supposed redundancy
between the Army's contingency and Marine Corps'
expeditionary forces. Powell again defended the status quo,
arguing that the present mix of capabilities was appropriate
and that the total number could be adjusted as the strategic
situation dictated. A related area was the issue of armor
and rocket artillery, which some had suggested was an
appropriate area for the Army to manage for both services.
General Powell argued that the Corp: should retain limited
amounts of tanks appropriate to its pre-positioned ships'
stocks and related training requirements, but above that
minimum the Army should provide armored units as required by
the mission. On the other hand, Powell recommended that the
Army retain sole ownership of the Multiple-Launch Rocket
System (MLRS) which, like additional armored units, could be
provided to the Marines by the Army when necessary.
2. A Proposal: A "Theater" Versus "Battlefield"
Mission Split
Although General Powell's recommendations seem to
have prevailed over more drastic proposals and taken the
momentum out of the issue - at least for the time being,
roles and missions will continue to be one of the most
sensitive inter-service problems and will surely be raised
again within a few short years. Since some issues - in
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particular, the question of CAS versus deep air support
(DAS) between the Army, Air Force, and Marines - impact
directly on the question of unity of command, a workable
solution to the roles and missions rift must be found.
One possible answer is to agree to a division of
labor on airspace command and control that recognizes the
Air Force - and, in an expeditionary environment (as opposed
to a "developed" or "mature" theater), the Navy - as
providing the primary theater or regional air command and
control agency, wherein both would retain primary missions
as operators of fighter, strike, and electronic warfare
aircraft. However, they would perform CAS only as a
secondary mission; the Army and Marine Corps would assume
the primary responsibilities as the providers of CAS.
Considering that the ground services have a direct,
vested interest in the proper execution of the CAS mission,
it is most sensible for them to assume the main effort in
this area. In effect, this is a "battlefield" mission that
requires a different mentality, training, and sense of
priorities from other theater-wide "big picture" missions
that I propose be shifted to Air Force and Navy primary
responsibility. In the same vein, Theater Air and Anti-
Ballistic Missile Defense would elso shift to a primarily
Air Force and Navy mission, although the Army and Marines
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would retain their short-to-medium range air defense weapons
(Stinger and HAWK) to allow them to maintain a local anti-
air "bubble" over their maneuver forces.
Taken from theory to practice, this compromise would
mean that the Army would be allowed to fly fixed-wing CAS-
capable aircraft, as well as limited airborne command and
control, and tanker aircraft in support of that mission.
Thus, the Army would pick up several wings worth of A-10s or
F-16s, and also some KC-130s for tanking and airborne
command and control of CAS. These fixed-wing CAS aircraft
could be organized as corps-level assets, either separately
or combined with the corps helicopter and air defense
brigades to form a corps air division along the lines of a
Marine Aircraft Wing.
The Marine Corps, which already possesses strong
fixed-wing air combat forces totaling 10 F/A-18C, 6 F/A-18D,
7 AV-8B, 4 EA-6B, and 3 KC-130 squadrons (approximately 500
total aircraft, not including training and reserve), would
in this compromise lose the operational control of its EA-
6Bs to the Navy or Air Force, and in practice most of its
F/A-18C squadrons would be integrated into Carrier Air Wings
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as their primary CAS outfit.12 2 Remaining under direct
Marine command would be F/A-18D, AV-8B, and KC-130
squadrons.
3. Roles and Missions: An Assessment
Under this compromise, the Army and Marine Corps
CAS-capable aircraft would retain their self-defense cannons
and missiles, and they would of course also retain their
fleets of attack, utility, and medium and heavy transport
helicopters. They would still be required to fly within the
confines of the theater-wide integrated air and missile
defense system, and their multi-mission aircraft could still
be "hijacked" on occasion by the JFACC should the need
arise. Despite this, the statutory protection that would
be provided to the Army and Marine Corps under this
agreement would help safeguard the aviation areas that both
deem essential: short-range air defense and close air
support. Still, service opposition to such an agreement
undoubtedly would be intense.
The Marine Corps may, on the surface at least, lose
more than it gains under such an agreement. It already
.
22Although OPCON of the EA-6B should rest with the Navy
or Air Force, it should remain administratively within the
FMF because the Corps' maintains a unique expeditionary
maintenance and logistics capability for this aircraft.
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possesses a nearly complete array of air and ground combat
capabilities that are well-integrated and effective. It
has developed this range of capabilities precisely because
it has learned (through a somewhat selective remembrance of
history) that the Navy exists first and foremost to protect
its own aircraft carriers and that the Air Force tends to
demand absolute control over Marine jet aircraft in theaters
of war. What would be gained under this compromise - an
effective division of labor and a greater degree of
"jointness" - may not be worth all that much to many
Marines, who see it as their business to fight and
win wars in expeditionary environments. As far as the
Marines are concerned, by the time the Army and Air Force
arrive with their sustaining forces, it is usually time for
the Marines to return to their ships or board chartered
airliners and return to home base in order to refit and
train for the next expeditionary task. Of course, the
historical record since World War II suggests that, to the
contrary, once major Marine formations are introduced
ashore, they stay there for as long as the conflict lasts -
be it an 'expeditionary' or 'developed' theater of war.
Regarding the Army, many of the soldiers who operate
the long-range air defense systems like the Patriot have no
great desire to work for the Air Force, even though their
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weapon system is already in effect under a high degree of
USAF/JFACC operational control. The Army also may not want
to incur the expense of operating and maintaining fixed-wing
jet aircraft after 45 years of the Air Force performing that
function. Additionally, the Army's heavy investment in
attack helicopters over the last ten years probably gives it
nearly all of what it would ever require in the way of CAS
on the future battlefield.
About the only service that may be happy with this
proposal is the Air Force, which has shown a reluctance to
dedicate the kind of resources deemed necessary by the Army
and the Congress toward the CAS mission. Its institutional
bias remains oriented toward the strategic bombing campaign,
and it tends to favor aircraft featuring higher "fighter"
qualities at the expense of "attack" qualities. The Air
Force would probably be quite happy to rid its force
structure of single-mission aircraft (like the A-10) and
limited multi-mission aircraft (like the F-16) so that it
could concentrate its resources on stealthy, high-
performance aircraft. Senior Air Force officers waged a
high-profile campaign in the fall of 1992 (prior to the
release of Powell's Roles and Missions Report) to gain
control of the Army's medium and high altitude missiles in
return for (in effect) giving up its fixed-wing CAS
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monopoly. 223 The Army balked at that proposal, not wanting
its "shield against enemy aircraft a hostage to Air Force
funding priorities", but the Air Force has recently (October
1993) raised this issue again with the new administration in
the hope of a different outcome. 2 24
Curiously, the men and women who fly and maintain
the A-10 might welcome such a swap, because they see the Air
Force as slow to modernize the airplane and intent on moving
it out of the active force and into the ANG as soon as
possible. As has been observed by some, Air Force pilots
often tend to place their loyalty and sense of
223see Barbara Opall, "U.S Air Force Plan Exhorts Shared
Role for CAS in Services," Defense News July 27 - August 2,
1992, 18. This included the Air Force proposal to elevate
all the services to the level of "primary" CAS mission
performance, which was adopted by Powell in his report.
Pentagon officials reportedly viewed this proposal as
allowing "the Air Force to gracefully relinquish its title
to CAS in favor of deep strike missions where the service is
investing heavily in precision, standoff weapons".
12 4For the 1992 debate, see Neil Munro, "U.S. Army
Resists Move by Air Force on Air Defense," Defense News,
September 14-20, 1992, 50. The latest move by USAF
officials is reported by Vago Muradian and Barbara Opall,
"USAF Revives Theater Defense Debate," Defense News November
1-7, 1993, 4.
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identification more with their particular mission and
aircraft rather than with the Air Force as a whole.22 5
The Navy, as noted before, may not have any great
objection to such a compromise, since it has openly
recognized and even embraced the "enabling force" mission
that places higher priority on expeditionary warfare.
Having a Marine F/A-18 squadron with every carrier air wing
would go a long way toward bridging the gap in combat
aviation caused by the demise of the A-12 and the planned
early retirement of the A-6 from the naval aviation
inventory. The "enabling" and supporting role envisioned
by the Navy's leaders for the foreseeable future does not
seem to run contrary to the proposed roles and mission
split, as long as the carrier-based deep strike mission is
not completely deleted.
One option to pursue until the roles and missions
statutes are revised (or if it is rejected) is to strengthen
the level of operational control by unified commanders. As
an example, the Army could establish an air command and
control center at the corps-level that would perform the
equivalent mission of a Marine Aircraft Wing, and as part of
22 5see Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American
Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989) 32-33.
174
this it could exercise operational control over an Air Force
CAS wing in addition to the command of the corps aviation
and air defense brigades. As a quid pro quo, greater
operational control over Army theater air defense units
could be given to the theater air commander and/or JFACC.
This option may fall far short of a perfect solution
to the roles and missions problem, but it would further
improve joint integration and training at the operational
and tactical levels of war. In fact, this second (OPCON)
option may be better than the first (statutory) in that the
peacetime operational subordination of some of the tactical
divisions, wings, groups, and brigades of one service to the
corps, air force, fleet, or MEF headquarters of another
service would force them to develop a joint approach to
warfighting that simply would not happen if contact between
the services were (or remains) essentially limited to
meetings at the four-star level.
Using the example of the "Atlantic Expeditionary
Corps" proposed earlier in this chapter, the benefits of
forming a joint Army-Marine corps-level headquarters with an
attached Air Force CAS wing operationally controlled by the
corps' Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters would be obvious.
The level of integration and interoperability that could be
attained by these units in peacetime would be significant,
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aided further by the fact that all are located in the
southeastern U.S. A rotating system of corps command
between Army and Marine Corps three-stars might help ensure
that the concept would be fully supported, and would help
revive a tradition going back to the joint X Corps in 1950
in Korea. Of course, the standard partisan response to such
a proposal would be to either (from the Army perspective)
give a Marine division to an Army Corps or (from the Marine
perspective) 'chop' an Army Light Division to a MEF. The
concern of both is that these service formations are i±ot
really unique (and thus defensible in budgetary terms) if
they don't maintain their separate existences and exclusive
missions. It is highly ironic that, whereas a permanent
exchange of divisions is scheduled to occur between German
and American corps in NATO, a similar level of peacetime
cooperation between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps is
utterly unimaginable because of the perceived institutional
threat posed by each to the other.22 6
Perhaps the greatest value of such a move would be
to create the ideal 'bridge' unit between rapid deployment,
226For a discussion of the planned NATO force structure,
see William T. Johnson and Thomas-Durell Young, "Preparing
for the NATO Summit: What Are the Pivotal Issues?,"
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 1993)
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but light, formations like the XVIII Airborne Corps and
follow-on Army and Air Force reinforcing units such as III
Corps. This would go a long way toward ensuring a seamless
flow of U.S. combat power from a contingency operation










V 17th 3rd 16th 6th
Corps Air Force Air Force Air Force Fleet
1st 3rd 2nd 36th 86th 20th 48th 401st CVBG ARG
Armd Inf Air Wing Wing Wing Wing Wing **




AOR: NATO and littoral seas
AOI: Eastern Europe
European Russia (shared with JCS)
North Africa
Levant (shared with SWACOM/CENTCOM)
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APPENDIX C
Northeast Asia (NEA) Theater Command
CINCNEA
USARNEA USAFNEA MARFORNEA USNAVNEA(8th Army) **
I 5th III 7th
Corps Air Force MEF Fleet
(Forward) **
I II II i I I
2nd 7th 18th 432d 1st 3rd CVBG ARG
Inf Air Wing Wing Marine Marine **
Div(-) Div(-) * * Air Div(-)




AOR: South Korea, Japan, and littoral seas
AOI: North Korea
Russian Far East (shared with JCS)
Eastern Manchuria (shared with PACOM)
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AOR: Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula States and Gulf, Jordan,
Egypt, Arabian and Red Seas.
AOI: Levant (shared with EUCOM), Pakistan (shared with





ACC FMF FORSCOM U.S.FLEET
C INC
AT LAN'ýTI
AFFOR MARFOR EXPEDITIONARY ARFOR NAVFOR
FORCES
9th Atlantic 2nd
Air Force Expeditionary Fleet
Corps
(II MEF HQ)
I II I I I II
1st 4th 33d 2nd 2nd 24th CVBG CVBG
Wing Wing Wing' Marine Marine Inf(Mech) * *
* * * AirWing Div Div
** ** **
II 11 .. .
56th 347 MAG 363 CVBG Amphib.
Wing Wing (VMAQ) Wing * Group
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL .
AOR: Central and South America and littoral waters, sub-
Saharan Africa and littoral waters, Atlantic Ocean
AOI: Approaches to Western Europe (as part of SACLANT AOR)
CINC Atlantic Expeditionary Forces is dual-hatted as the





ACC FMF FORSCOM U.S.FLEET
CINC
PACIFIC
AFFOR MARFOR EXPEDITIONARY ARFOR NAVFOR
FORCES
llth I I 3rd
Air Force MEF Corps Fleet
343d 3d 1st 3rd 1st 25th CVBG CVBG
Wing Wing Marine Marine Air Inf(L) ** **
* * Div Air Div Div
** ** ** **
CVBG CVBG





AOR: South and Southeast Asia, China (East Manchuria shared
with Northeast Asia Command), Pacific Ocean Area (less
Northeast Asian and South American littoral seas),
Indian Ocean Area (less Southwest Asia and African
littoral seas)
AOI: Pakistan
CINC Pacific Expeditionary Forces is dual-hatted as the
Deputy CINCPAC as well as the provisional sub-unified CINC
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82nd 101st 10th 23rd Marine Marine
Airborne Air Assault Mountain Wing Air Exped.
Division Division Division * Cont. Brigade
S* ** ** Force (MPS)
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"APPENDIX H
Strategic Mobilization/Reinforcing Forces Command
CINC
ACC FORSCOM FMF U.S.FLEET
I II 1k,
AFFOR ARFOR MARFOR NAVFOR
(3rdArmy) **
12th XVIII III IV 4th
Air Force Corps Corps MEF Fleet
S II I I I I I I
49th 388th 13th 1st 1st 4th 4th Car Surf
Wing Wing Air Cav Inf Marine Marine Gru Gru
* * Div Div Div Div Air * *
366th 24th
Wing Wing 355th MCM
* * Wing Group
* *




High-level Operational and Administrative
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NEA PAC REIN LANT EUR SWA
AIR FLEET U.S. ARMY
COMBAT MARINE FLEET FORCES
COMMAND FORCE COMMAND
I--------..1-. II I i i* I I
AF AR MAR NAV AR AF MAR NAV AF AR MAR NAV
FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR
PAC PAC PAC PAC REIN REIN REIN REIN LANT LANT LANT LANT
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APPENDIX J
UNIFIED COIAND PLAN BOUNDARIZES
(PRESENT)
95 W 100 E
92 W 17EZ
Source: "Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the
Armed Forces of the United States of America,"
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